As of June 19, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has arrested about 280 Palestinians, out of which 51 are Hamas activists who had been released as part of the deal for the return of Gilad Shalit. These arrests are part of Operation Brother’s Keeper, as the search for three abducted youths — Eyal Yifrach, Gilad Shaar and Naftali Frenkel — continues throughout the West Bank. The biggest dilemma for the security services is how to successfully fight Hamas activists and leaders without discovering in a few months or years that the moves against the movement did not weaken it but only solidified its ranks.

The question of questions that has been haunting Israel throughout the years of its war against Hamas is what is the most efficient weapon of deterrence against the movement? Paradoxically, in certain cases, military operations that were intended to scare the movement’s leaders and activists actually rapidly increased support among the Palestinian public for Hamas. This is what happened during the second intifada, when Hamas was viewed by the Palestinians as a victim, and its leaders succeeded in translating these feelings into triumph at the ballot box during Palestinian Authority (PA) elections in January 2006.

Several months later, the kidnapping of the Israeli soldier Shalit brought another round of conflict between Hamas and Israel. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert ordered the IDF to conduct a large-scale military campaign in Gaza, Operation Summer Rains, which lasted for five months. The strategy behind the operation was to put as much pressure as possible on Gaza's population. The assumption was that the Palestinians would tire of Hamas and apply counterpressure on the movement’s leadership, thus prompting Shalit’s release by his kidnappers.

About 400 Palestinians were killed during the course of Operation Summer Rains, about a third of them civilians. Under orders of the political leadership, the IDF destroyed infrastructure in Gaza, such as bridges, buildings and roads, including a power station whose bombing caused a massive blackout that lasted months. Operation Summer Rains did not, however, lead to Shalit’s release. After the fact, it was discovered that the operation had only raised the "price" on the abducted soldier. Today, it seems that the lesson has been learned. Olmert’s mantra of “The boss has gone mad,” as market vendors shout, proved to be a fallacy. As we know, Shalit was released in a prisoner exchange deal after five years, in October 2011.