Israeli 'Deterrence' Strategy in Gaza Unlikely to Bring Stability
The recent clash between Israel and Palestinian groups suggests that the conclusions on deterrence drawn from Israel’s 2012 campaign in Gaza were flawed, writes Jean-Loup Samaan.
On April 2, the Israeli Air Force launched an air strike on the Gaza Strip in retaliation for the firing of three mortar shells into the western Negev. The Israeli fighters attacked two targets near Beit Lahia, in northern Gaza. In response to the IAF’s operations, two rockets were then launched by Palestinian militants into the southern town of Sderot. After this short round of violence, both sides appeared to opt for de-escalation.
This new clash occurred just two weeks after US President Obama’s visit to Israel and Palestine, which had already been marked by the firing of four rockets into Israel. Moreover, the Israeli military response of April 2 was the first strike since the declaration of a truce that ended the Operation Pillar of Defense last November. Although it is difficult to establish an explicit linkage, these skirmishes occurred in the midst of increasing tension in Palestinian territories over the death of Maysara Abu Hamdiyeh. A Palestinian prisoner sentenced to life in 2002 for attempted murder, Maysara died of cancer in Israeli jails, and Palestinian claims of medical negligence have triggered widespread protests in the West Bank and Gaza. But beyond these tensions, the last round of fire between the Israelis and the Palestinians underlines some important lessons that had been ignored, or downplayed, back in November in the aftermath of Pillar of Defense.
Contrary to the mainstream narrative inside Israel, the 2012 operation did not achieve any tangible goal. In early 2013, military officers and diplomats in Israel were keen on asserting that the operation had been successful in deterring rocket fire from Gaza and in preventing future aggression. Surely the 2012 Israeli operation was less ill-advised than the “Cast Lead” campaign of 2009, which fueled international controversy and cost Israel a three-year falling out with Turkey. But its political and military goals remain questionable. In the words of Israeli officials, it was a limited operation that did not aim at changing the balance of power in Gaza but merely at "restoring Israeli deterrence."
This leads us to an important lesson from last week’s clash: The concept of deterrence is barely relevant in the context of Israel-Gaza confrontation. Following Pillar of Defense, the expression "restoring Israel’s deterrence" was repeatedly used, but only a few observers asked what precisely was restored. When challenged on this topic, IDF’s officers argue that Israel’s conception of deterrence differs from the Western approach; that deterrence in the Israeli context is not a pure end but a cumulative process that includes sporadic clashes to re-establish the rules of the game. Under this intellectual framework, last week’s exchange of fire would serve to reinforce the fault lines. But the fact that Israelis do not disconnect deterrence from the use of force throws into question the very concept.
