Will Saudi Arabia save Hamas?

Hamas leaders' denials of a crisis in their organization’s relations with Iran have been put to rest. It is now official. In a July 24 interview with Al Jazeera, senior Hamas official Mousa Abu Marzouk admitted in no uncertain terms that Iran has discontinued the military and civilian support it had extended to the Palestinian group for years. In addition to the staggering quantity of weapons smuggled into Gaza, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had provided counseling, briefings and training for members of Hamas’ military wing, thus setting the movement’s tone and modus operandi for a very long time. In other words, Hamas, which enjoyed a considerable infusion of weaponry and money, had been Iran’s proxy on Israel’s southern border.

Even when the movement’s pragmatic members thought that extra caution should be exercised in relations vis-à-vis Israel, the organization’s military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, acted as an independent body, whose interests overlapped those of its Iranian patron. The position adopted by Khaled Meshaal, head of Hamas' political bureau, opposing President Bashar al-Assad after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, resulted in the split from Tehran. Yet, over the years, there were factions that maintained ties with the Iranian regime, hoping to somehow mend fences between the two sides. This is all now a thing of the past.

Ties with Iran and its military aid had not been instantly severed. A channel of communication remained open between the movement's senior member, Mahmoud al-Zahar, and Iran, or “our friend,” as he preferred. As a perk, Zahar received some assistance provided to him on a personal basis. Ismail Haniyeh, deputy chief of Hamas’ political bureau, was more careful. In February 2012, he paid a visit to Iran, to the displeasure of Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, the Qatari emir, who had briefly supported the movement.

The leaders of the military wing — Ahmed Jabari, who was killed by the Israel Defense Forces at the start of Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012, and Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades commander Mohammed al-Deif — also maintained ties with Iran, knowing that if they wanted to keep their military power and maintain their elevated standing within the movement, they had to fight to remain in Iran’s good graces. They knew full well that Tehran's assistance was irreplaceable. Several attempts were made last year to organize a reconciliation meeting between Meshaal and officials in Tehran, but they came to naught.