On October 12, Turkey will have a tiny “election” little noticed outside of the country but eagerly awaited in Ankara. This time, those headed to the ballot box are not ordinary citizens, but judges and prosecutors across the country who will elect almost half of the members of their top institution: the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), which has the power to appoint, dismiss or investigate all men of law.

The top contenders in the race appear to represent the three poles that reflect the bitter political division in the country: pro-government judges and prosecutors; pro-Gulen movement judges and prosecutors; and pro-secular judges and prosecutors.

This bizarre race is a result of Turkey’s “democratization” — or at least it was hailed as such by the proponents of the 2010 referendum for constitutional amendments, which redesigned the way Turkey’s high judiciary was formed. Before that referendum, the HSYK was formed by a regular system of appointees from other high judicial bodies — such as the Council of State or the High Court of Appeals. But these institutions were dominated by a single worldview — Kemalism, i.e., the secular nationalism that has its roots in the Mustafa Kemal Ataturk era (1923-38). Therefore, the high judiciary was designed to work in a system of “co-option,” where jurists with similar views appointed each other to powerful seats.

Those who voiced the criticisms of this system included some secular liberals, but the real vehicles of change were the religious conservatives. The latter had two main flagships, which then were strong allies: then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Fethullah Gulen’s millions-strong religious movement, which was rumored to have many members in the lower ranks of the judicial caste. No wonder both sides campaigned together for the referendum, which they won with 58% of the vote.