Armed with parliamentary approval for cross-border military action, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has full authority to intervene in neighboring Libya, a prospect that could lead to a conventional military confrontation between regional rivals Egypt and Turkey, which back opposing sides in Libya's proxy war.

Strategic planning in Ankara focuses on a three factors: Egypt’s ground, air, naval and proxy capabilities, its actual willingness for intervention and the international context.

Ankara believes Egypt’s land forces are too weak for a large-scale ground operation and security sources interviewed by Al-Monitor unanimously dismiss the prospect. Egypt’s shortcomings in the fight against the Islamic State in the Sinai Peninsula, Ankara reckons, show that its land forces lack much capacity in low-intensity conflicts as well. Another prevailing view is that the Egyptian army is haunted by a “strategic trauma” around foreign ventures after its failed intervention in Yemen in the 1960s, often referred to as “Egypt’s Vietnam.” In sum, Ankara seems to confidently rule out a comprehensive ground operation by Egypt in Libya.

The lessons from the Arab-Israeli wars in 1967 and 1973 and military trends since the 1990-1991 Gulf War show that any large-scale military operation in a terrain with vast deserts like Libya would need a certain degree of air superiority and close air support. Hence, Ankara is preoccupied with whether Egypt will receive open or covert air support from the United Arab Emirates, its chief ally in Libya, and Russia.