The most unexpected result from Turkey's June 24 elections was the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) winning 11.1% of the vote. The MHP had formed a coalition with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), because all the polls predicted that the MHP could not reach the 10% threshold to enter parliament. Competition from the new Good Party (IYI), an MHP offshoot, was thought to be the cause. 

The IYI entered into an alliance with the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) for the same basic reason. The IYI indeed failed to surpass the vote threshold, with 9.96% of the vote, but it still made it into parliament through its coalition with the CHP. Thus, 20% of parliament's representation is ultra-nationalist. Considering that the AKP also counts former MHP members among its ranks, a seasoned AKP bureaucrat told Al-Monitor, “At least one in every four lawmakers in the new parliament has an ultranationalist background.” All told, 65% of the seats belong to right-wing parties.

Implementation of Turkey's new electoral system also means that the losing presidential candidates do not have seats in parliament. Hence, unless they pursue alternatives, none of the victorious Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s most outspoken opponents will have an official role in politics. “Without a party title, they will hold no weight in Ankara,” said the AKP bureaucrat. “Out of sight, out of mind.” 

Yet MHP leader Devlet Bahceli remains in parliament and is likely to continue as Erdogan’s main ally in enacting legislation. Bahceli’s unwavering alliance with Erdogan since the botched coup in July 2016 was one reason some assumed the MHP would soon be absorbed by the AKP. So, how and why did the MHP retain its vote share? How and why did ultra-nationalist vote share overall increase two-fold? Preliminary analysis of the election data suggests three crucial reasons.