Did the Turkish government bargain with the putschists on the night of July 15? Who was involved in the political aspects of the coup? A parliamentary commission was supposed to answer these and other critical questions still hanging over the attempted coup, which has had dramatic consequences for the country. Earlier in December, however, the investigative commission abruptly wrapped up its work at the behest of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The commission of lawmakers from all four parties in parliament began its work in October, with heated arguments between members of the opposition and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Representatives of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) insisted that Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar and head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) Hakan Fidan be summoned to answer questions about the afternoon of July 15 and the momentous night that followed. But though the two were at the heart of the events, the AKP members rejected the demand.

The government has blamed the botched coup on US-based cleric Fethullah Gulen and his followers in the military, rebranding the community as the Fethullah Gulen Terror Organization. Many aspects of the putsch remain murky, with the government reluctant to discuss them publicly. The Gulen community was the AKP’s chief ally until December 2013, when massive corruption probes implicating Cabinet ministers and Erdogan’s family rattled Ankara. The government blocked the probes, arguing they were trumped up by Gulenist police and prosecutors in a bid to topple the AKP. The close relationship between Gulen and the AKP prior to the fallout is another topic the government is averse to discussing today.

To dilute debate on such inconvenient issues, the AKP members of the investigation commission followed a particular strategy. They invited a plethora of retired politicians and military officers to flesh out their thesis that Gulenists had been backed by all governments in the past four decades, which saw Gulen become a prominent figure in the country. The strategy, however, often backfired. Former police chief and Interior Minister Mehmet Agar, for instance, asserted that no Gulenist was promoted to a senior position during his tenures in the 1990s, blaming the Gulenist entrenchment in the police on the AKP. Former Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok said top military commanders had warned the AKP government at a National Security Council meeting in 2004 that the Gulenists had become too powerful in the state and proposed an action plan. “We monitored what was being done, but frankly we didn’t see much,” he said.