While working on a documentary about Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, I had the chance to meet Abu Omar, a former IS operative who was once an inmate in the infamous Camp Bucca facility that brought together all those who later became the ruling elite of the most notorious terrorist group in modern history. I asked Abu Omar whether there was any recipe to defeat IS, which seemed unbeatable. In response, he smiled and said, “First, the world will have to really believe it exists — that it’s not an American conspiracy, nor a Turkish secret project, nor an Iranian-Syrian backed organization — that it’s simply the most advanced edition of global jihad resulting from 30 years of experience. It also must not be conceded that no one can win this war.”
Since the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924, the dream of reviving the caliphate has been alive in the souls of those adopting political Islam as a doctrine. Ordinary Muslims' feelings of weakness and a sense of disconnection with and lack of support from the regimes that have ruled the Arab and Muslim world grew over time and was inherited by members of the Muslim millennial generation who wanted to belong to an entity that blends power, religion and modernity. IS came with the three together. While many might debate the last point, IS is using cutting-edge technologies in many of their activities, including in the professional use of media tools that fulfill a feeling of superiority through well-crafted videos and clips. As for power, IS was able to prove its strength by creating a de facto state within the borders of Syria and Iraq, challenging the world powers and showing a high level of discipline in the areas under their control. The other element, religion, is the magnet that directly or indirectly attracts people to IS, for the group introduces itself as the guarantor for the application of God’s rule on Earth, and that the caliph is a continuation of the Prophet Muhammad’s legacy.
The fact is that the Islamic State, as a doctrine and practice, has been an unbeatable model in the Sunni Muslim world to those seeking this blend of religion, power and modernity. Sunni and Shiite Islamists shared many similar aspirations until the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran succeeded in toppling the Shah; at the time, Sunni Islamists such as Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, the co-founder of al-Qaeda with Osama bin Laden, celebrated Imam Ruhollah Khomeini’s victory in one of Amman’s mosques. Later it became clear that the revolution was more an answer to the aspirations of Shiite Islamists than Sunnis; therefore, the next stop for Azzam and his comrades was Afghanistan, and they later became what were called the Afghan Arabs.
When the creation of the Islamic State was announced, one of the main strategies adopted by its leadership was social engagement. The de facto, self-styled state opened its doors to jihadi foreigners, and thousands came with their families and settled in cities under IS control; according to a UN report, more than 25,000 from over 100 nations have made it to IS territory. Some of them get married to women from tribes in the areas in order to strengthen ties and complicate any attempts to oust IS. The foreign jihadis are persona non grata in their home countries, and if IS falls, their lives and future may be endangered wherever they may be; they have no safe haven but the Islamic State and therefore will fight to the last man standing to keep it alive.
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