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Number of centrifuges should not prevent nuclear deal

Previous attempts at a nuclear deal between Iran and West fell apart over the number of centrifuges; will it happen again?
Technicians work at a uranium processing site in Isfahan 340 km (211 miles) south of the Iranian capital Tehran.  Technicians work at a uranium processing site in Isfahan 340 km (211 miles) south of the Iranian capital Tehran March 30, 2005. France, Britain and Germany are considering letting Iran keep nuclear technology that could be used to make bombs, an apparent move towards a compromise with Tehran, diplomats said on Wednesday. REUTERS/Raheb Homavandi - RTR6IQH

The current status of the nuclear talks is not dissimilar to that of talks between Iran and the European Union in 2005. At that time, too, there was huge optimism around the complete resolution of Iran’s nuclear case but disagreements over the permitted number of centrifuges gradually mounted and eventually caused the failure of the talks, leading to mutual distrust. There are lessons of the 2005 talks, which can prevent the failure of the current round of negotiations.

Following the Paris Agreement of November 2004, the parties were close to an agreement in 2005. As a reassuring gesture, Iran suspended enrichment activities, import of centrifuge parts and all research and development (R&D) activities and actually took cooperation to such a level that for the first time in two years, Iran’s nuclear case was not even mentioned in the March 2005 sitting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

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