The current status of the nuclear talks is not dissimilar to that of talks between Iran and the European Union in 2005. At that time, too, there was huge optimism around the complete resolution of Iran’s nuclear case but disagreements over the permitted number of centrifuges gradually mounted and eventually caused the failure of the talks, leading to mutual distrust. There are lessons of the 2005 talks, which can prevent the failure of the current round of negotiations.

Following the Paris Agreement of November 2004, the parties were close to an agreement in 2005. As a reassuring gesture, Iran suspended enrichment activities, import of centrifuge parts and all research and development (R&D) activities and actually took cooperation to such a level that for the first time in two years, Iran’s nuclear case was not even mentioned in the March 2005 sitting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

At that time, IAEA inspectors were given full daily access to Iranian nuclear sites and the agency’s director-general confirmed that in his reports. The actual agreement covered more than just the nuclear issue; it included economic, political and even security cooperation between Iran and the three European countries (France, United Kingdom and Germany, or EU3).

It was then Europe’s turn to deliver on the commitments made in the Paris Agreement. However, on the anniversary of the agreement (November 2005) and under circumstances that hardly left much room for optimism, Iran’s case had been prepared to be sent to the UN Security Council. What prevented the talks from reaching a final agreement was the same issue that hangs over the success of the talks today, namely the number of centrifuges that Iran is allowed to have. In 2005, it was the actual number of centrifuges, but today it is their capacity.