Disarray, confusion and demoralization are the three words that best describe the state of the Syrian opposition forces in the aftermath of the avoidance of the US military strike and the peaceful settlement of the chemical weapons crisis. For certain people, that episode is reminiscent of how former Libyan President Moammar Gadhafi — though under different circumstances — was able to exchange the assurances of his survival via barter diplomacy, and thus get rid of his pariah status. He did so by signing the Chemical Weapons Convention and by adhering to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

For Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, it was considered a way to buy time, a very precious commodity. The settlement of the crisis, or the beginning of it, via UN Security Council Resolution 2118 led to a sort of demobilization of US escalatory diplomacy. Such diplomacy was strongly supported, not only by Syrian opposition factions but also by regional friends who invested in its great expectations.

For them, it provided the opportunity to change the rules of the game and accelerate the change of the Syrian regime. What added to this trilogy of feelings mentioned here, was the US-Iranian opening and fear of the implications of such opening — if successful — on the future of the Syrian crisis. From an analytical point of view, it looks like the opposition's regional friends have indicated through various diplomatic means their frustrations and unhappiness with the US policy.

The Syrian National Coalition (SNC) was also split between those willing to go to Geneva II under certain conditions, and those who considered it impossible under the new power balance resulting from the US-Russian understanding. Thus, the conditions presented by the SNC to go to Geneva, including the assurances that Assad would be evicted, did not reflect the reality of the power balance.