Skip to main content

Is Iranian Hyperinflation a Mirage?

Djavad Salehi-Isfahani suggests that the conventional wisdom of so-called Iranian hyperinflation caused by crippling Western sanctions deserves a closer look, as there is lack of connection between devaluation, printing of money and inflation in Iran. Guessing wrong on the impact of sanctions can be costly for US policy.
EDITORS' NOTE: Reuters and other foreign media are subject to Iranian restrictions on leaving the office to report, film or take pictures in Tehran.

An exchange currency dealer sits at his shop as he waits for customer in Tehran's business district October 24, 2011. Iranian media reported last week that monetary authorities had reversed a six-month-old decision to cut interest on bank deposits, aiming to mop up excess cash in the economy and halt a dangerous rise of inflation. The news made sense to econom

The story of Iran’s hyperinflation was not a hoax, but instead reflected a deep misunderstanding of Iran’s economic situation. Sensational stories of economic collapse in Iran appeared in the blogosphere and in the mainstream press — and they simply were not true. Since accurately understanding the impact of sanctions is critical for setting US policy, what lessons can we learn from this episode?

In late September 2012, Iran’s currency took a dive, falling by about 50% in two weeks. This was seen as a definitive sign that sanctions against Iran were bearing fruit, that Iran’s economy was on the verge of collapse and that the West would face a humbled Iranian leadership in the nuclear standoff. The key to the story was a prediction published on the website of the conservative Cato Institute that the devaluation would cause prices in Iran to rise by 70% per month, doubling every 38 days, which is hyperinflation.

Access the Middle East news and analysis you can trust

Join our community of Middle East readers to experience all of Al-Monitor, including 24/7 news, analyses, memos, reports and newsletters.

Subscribe

Only $100 per year.