Perhaps as a psychological defense mechanism against potential Muslim Brotherhood victories in the coming elections as well as the continued enlargement of President Mohammed Morsi’s and the Brotherhood’s circle of national power and influence, some on the opposition-sympathizing side seem to be trying to hedge their bets on the idea that Morsi and Brotherhood would dominate all the national seats and loci of power. However, their bet goes on, while additionally citing Morsi’s inability to fulfill most of his promises for the first 100 days in office, Morsi and the Brotherhood would then inevitably fail in managing the country throughout this difficult national juncture and push people in consequence toward the opposition in the following elections. 

Approaching this dubious line of argumentation: While it's indeed conceivable that the Brotherhood — much like any other entity in their shoes in such a difficult time — may not necessarily succeed in wowing voters and the world with their management of the state, and while there is indeed big room for missteps, the odds seem stacked up against an outright failure.

First, the Muslim Brotherhood have pretty much found themselves heading a country at subzero conditions, as one friend puts it, and merely returning it to something resembling its previous condition could be touted as an achievement. Stabilizing it even could also be spun as such. And as social adaptation kicks in, more Egyptians will learn how to better survive or even relatively move forward in the current conditions.

And, despite everything, there is still a decent chance that the global economic environment might somewhat rebound fairly soon (assuming Europe manages to stabilize), necessarily having some positive influence on Egypt's and the region’s overall economy and social conditions. In addition, the global community is very unlikely to encourage (intentionally or unintentionally) Egypt and its Islamist-led government to shift into a relatively more-autarkic domestic policy, or further towards a more regional or Sino-centric dependency. Instead, an open Egyptian economy that trades with the world, and an Egyptian foreign policy that does not see cooperation with the West as a cosmetic afterthought, both form obvious political, social and geopolitical critical benefits and needs for the international community. Every major economic and political actor is thus expected to work toward that target, and to build long relationships with Egypt’s - and the region’s - new political powerhouse.