By late November, it seemed as if Egypt’s opposition had finally found its mojo. It was more united than ever, now under the new banner of the National Salvation Front (NSF). It had common, clear and precise public goals. It was capable of instigating massive public protests that at least rivaled those of the Islamists, and people seemed to actually be looking up to them with some degree of hope. The opposition had the president and the Brotherhood increasingly cornered, and the possibility that the NSF might come out as victors from November’s constitutional crisis, or the political conflict that ensued, did not seem entirely far-fetched.

Nearly five months later, the story looks drastically different. An image of internal disharmony surrounds the NSF. Morsi and the Brotherhood increasingly appear to be on the opposite end of a checkmate, and seem rather more emboldened and comfortable with unilateralism. The opposition has gotten very few, if any, of its core demands. Other than failing to stop the aggressive pushing of the divisive constitution, the opposition’s unachieved demands include getting detailed commitment to amend the new constitution in a consensus-building manner, sacking the controversially appointed current prosecutor-general, changing the Hisham Qandil government with a new and neutral cabinet until the elections (a less prominent alternative was a national coalition government), an agreeable electoral law, and more. The response? Morsi did reshuffle the cabinet a few days ago, but he defiantly kept Qandil and also brought in a few more Brotherhood members and loyalists, a sign of not feeling much pressure. The streets of Egypt also appear to be increasingly devoid of any mass protests. What’s more, a recent opinion poll has indicated that while Morsi’s popularity has fallen to its lowest level ever, the NSF’s popularity seems to be painfully suffering as well.

So, what happened?

Well, setting aside an increasingly unreasonable, paranoid and power-drunk Brotherhood, several things did go wrong. First, the NSF often seemed torn between wanting to engineer calculated political pressure, one that could bring Morsi and the Brotherhood back toward a more desirable political path, and between an all-out immediate confrontation that could only push the president and the Brotherhood to become more stubborn, paranoid and fight back in an existential battle. The opposition’s demands and movements, from time to time, also appeared articulated and presented in a manner that made it harder for Morsi to respond positively while sufficiently saving face in front of the public and his base, pushing him further toward the option of soldiering on no matter the potential consequences. Of course, that is not to say that Morsi, or the Brotherhood, would have necessarily responded amicably had the approach been different.