The ongoing dispute between Iran and Saudi Arabia following the kingdom’s execution of Saudi Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr on terrorism charges adds to many of the Middle East’s existing problems, but might be especially challenging for Russia’s foreign policy in the region.

As a rule, Moscow has consistently sought to maintain cooperative relationships across the Middle East and, where possible, avoid taking sides in ways that could damage long-term Russian interests. Thus, for example, Russia has supported Palestinian aspirations for an independent state and criticized Israeli settlement policy while building a strong economic relationship with Israel and withholding condemnation of Israeli responses to domestic terrorism.

Similarly, notwithstanding its cooperation with Iran; intense concern over Sunni extremism and its contribution to terrorism inside Russia; reservations about Saudi and Qatari support for armed groups opposing Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad; and suspicions about Saudi motives for allowing oil prices to remain so low for so long, Moscow has recognized Saudi Arabia’s central role and has tried to build a working relationship with Riyadh and through it with other predominantly Sunni states. Searching the Kremlin website shows that President Vladimir Putin has had three acknowledged telephone conversations and one meeting with Saudi Arabia’s King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud, plus a meeting with Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, since Russia’s intervention in Syria. Putin also had two publicly disclosed telephone calls with the Saudi king in the two weeks before he launched Russia’s airstrikes.

Russia’s work-with-everyone approach to the Middle East is logical from a national interest perspective. Since Moscow lacks the power or influence to produce its preferred outcomes unilaterally, its leaders and diplomats have no alternative but to rely upon bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to achieve their objectives. In a region in which it often seems impossible to know what might happen next, this creates disincentives for spoiling relations with governments that could become important in the future. That goes double for Russia’s interactions with key regional powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia.