To the sentence “Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East” — which is summed up in the term “the policy of ambiguity” — another expression has been added in recent years: “Israel maintains the right to defend itself.” In slight variations, this sentence has been repeatedly stated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, following the agreement with Iran that was signed in Geneva on Nov. 24.

This, if you wish, is a delicate phrasing of an explicit threat on Iran and the five permanent UN Security Council members and Germany, or P5+1 forum, that if the agreement that was reached by diplomatic means will not be satisfactory to Netanyahu, Israel will exercise the right to self-defense to forcibly stop the Iranian nuclear program. In Netanyahu’s view and that of US congressmen who side with him, a retreat from the nuclear program requires the closure of the uranium enrichment plant in Fordow and the heavy water reactor in Arak, through which Iran could create plutonium.

Against “Israel’s right to defend itself,” Iran pits its right to enrich uranium and develop plutonium. This position finds support in a document attached four months ago to the report published by the Congressional Research Service ahead of a Senate hearing. Appendix C to the report quotes William Foster, who was the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the head of the US mission to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) talks.

In testimony before the Senate in July 1968, a short time after signing the treaty, which he had helped formulate, Foster said that according to US interpretation, a nation that is a signatory of the treaty (but not in the nuclear club) such as Iran is allowed to enrich uranium and to store fissionable material for civilian purposes. Likewise, there is no prohibition on such a nation to develop reactors fueled by plutonium, including researching plutonium’s metallic properties. All this holds as long as the nation does not violate paragraph 2 of the treaty, where it agrees to refrain from creating and acquiring nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Another condition is that the activity that takes place in its facilities should satisfy the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).