The seizure and rendition of key al-Qaeda operative Abu Anas al-Libi in Tripoli on Oct. 5 is being hailed as a victory for American counterterrorism efforts. Given that Libi — or Nazih Abdul Hamed al-Raghie, as he is known in civilian life — has been a wanted man in the United States for more than a decade, a victory undoubtedly it is. Libi is under indictment in the United States for his alleged role in the 1998 African embassy bombings. On closer inspection, however, the rendition operation also exposes the contradictions of American Libya policy and, in particular, the boon for al-Qaeda-linked and al-Qaeda-inspired groups that the US-backed Feb. 17 revolution against Moammar Gadhafi has represented.

Indeed, the very fact that Libi could have been living openly in Tripoli is a direct result of the triumph of the anti-Gadhafi revolution. Albeit little known to most Americans, during the last years of Gadhafi’s rule, the “old” Libya had become a “critical ally in US counterterrorism efforts” — as one leaked State Department memo put it. Gadhafi was particularly eager to cooperate, given his interest in taming Libya’s own homegrown al-Qaeda affiliate, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). The organization — of which Libi was a member — had long been dedicated to overturning Gadhafi's “apostate” rule and replacing it with Islamic governance.

It is surely no coincidence that, per the declarations of his son Abdullah, Libi returned to Tripoli in August 2011. It was at this very time that rebel forces seized control of the Libyan capital, their path to Tripoli having been paved by massive NATO bombing. If the “new” Libya that has emerged as a result was likewise an effective and reliable ally of the United States, then a simple extradition request ought to have sufficed for the United States to obtain custody of Libi. Special forces raids conducted in defiance of another country’s sovereignty are typically reserved for hostile or failed states.

That the triumph of the Libyan rebellion would, on the contrary, provide an exceptionally hospitable environment for al-Qaeda and kindred jihadist organizations was inevitable. As documented in my recent book The Jihadist Plot: The Untold Story of Al-Qaeda and the Libyan Rebellion, it was none other than the LIFG that provided the military backbone of the anti-Gadhafi rebellion. The history of close cooperation between the LIFG and al-Qaeda was so extensive that the Libyan group figured among the very first organizations to be designated as al-Qaeda affiliates by the UN Security Council in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, by the late 1990s — long before Ayman al-Zawahiri officially announced the “merger” of the two groups — the LIFG was already essentially operating as a full-fledged al-Qaeda chapter.