The Libyan government faces an unusual political crisis that threatens to change the course of the revolution, and at the center of it is US policy. The seizure of a senior al-Qaeda operative, Abu Anas al-Libi, by American commandos on Oct. 5, an operation according to the Libyan government conducted without its approval, has triggered a dramatic series of events that could accelerate a massive wave of change across the Libyan political landscape.

The kidnapping of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan on Oct. 10 by the Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Room and the bombing outside the Swedish Consulate in Benghazi the following day underscore a new chapter of violence that must be carefully assessed. The story of al-Qaeda in Libya is a complex tale, the understanding of which can benefit from a degree of hindsight. The violent fallout since Libi's capture must be carefully measured to discern where al-Qaeda fits, if at all, in the revolutionary narrative permeating the political and international discourse.

The original targeting of and attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi on Sept. 11, 2012, was viewed locally in a variety of ways. Locals claimed to never have heard of, and in any case lacked the Internet speed to view the trailer for Innocents of Muslims, the film said to insult the Prophet Muhammad and to have been in production in the United States. Jihadist groups in Benghazi, angered by speculation and claims of espionage and intelligence gathering conducted by 21 CIA personnel at a building adjacent to the US mission in Benghazi, are considered the more likely culprits for carrying out the consulate attack. Local assessment now links the operation to capture Libi to the very same intelligence-gathering suspected in 2012. This is likely to resonate with local jihadist groups, and more important, al-Qaeda.

Until now, there has been little to no evidence to suggest that Libya is operationally significant to al-Qaeda. The signature-style bombings, supreme acts of violence to herald a new world, have been distinctly lacking. The infamous audio and videotapes and claims of responsibility by al-Qaeda leaders are also absent. The foreign presence in Libya works closely with civil society, and thus disturbs the required social environment al-Qaeda needs to operate and, indeed, to flourish.