On April 19, Sudan officially decided to abolish its 1958 law on boycotting Israel. A bill for the abolishment of the boycott was presented to the Sudanese Cabinet on April 6 and ratified this week jointly by the Sudanese ruling Sovereignty Council and the Cabinet. Sudanese Justice Minister Nasredeen Abdulbari announced the decision, which should enable bilateral ties to progress. It would allow Sudanese to do business with Israelis and enable Sudanese to visit relatives living in Israel.

Evidently, the Sudanese decision is significant both practically and on the symbolic level. On top of the 1958 boycott, Israel still remembers the post-1967 Six-Day War Khartoum Resolution of the Arab League containing the three famous nos: No peace with Israel. No recognition of Israel. No negotiation with Israel. That being said, official Israel kept quiet and did not react to the decision to abolish the Sudanese boycott. Neither the office of the prime minister nor the Foreign Ministry issued any comment on the issue. Sources at the Foreign Ministry say that for the sake of bilateral ties, Jerusalem needs to keep a low profile on any such advancements in Khartoum.

The necessity of keeping a low profile was a lesson learned the hard way. On April 16, Sudan denied reports that it would send its first official delegation to Israel. Two sources told Reuters that Khartoum had scrapped a planned visit. They confirmed such an invitation to visit Israel had been accepted but said plans had later changed. Sudan's general intelligence service was quoted as saying that "news circulating on some media and social media about the visit of a security delegation to Sudan was not true."

Earlier in April, Israeli press published several reports over Khartoum preparing a first security and intelligence delegation to Jerusalem. These reports followed the highly mediatized visit of Israeli Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen in Sudan last January. Cohen led a large delegation, which included also Israeli businesspeople, apparently without consulting beforehand with the Foreign Ministry or with the Trade Ministry. Apparently, the high mediatization of every step on the road to rebuilding bilateral ties makes Khartoum’s transitional Cabinet uncomfortable.