In an April 5 speech, Ammar al-Hakim, head of the Citizen Coalition, said that his coalition’s reform-minded approach is based on three tenets: the need for Iraq to be ruled by a competent team without wasting time on managing crises; the necessity to adopt a clear legal road map to restructure the Iraqi state; and the initiation of a real administrative revolution in state institutions.

The Citizen Coalition represents an alliance between the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and 18 other parties and factions, including the Iraqi National Congress headed by Ahmad Chalabi, and individuals such as former government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh and former Interior Minister Jawad al-Boulani. The coalition is the outcome of a renewal process in the ISCI, beginning among the leadership, which has influenced its formation and rhetoric. Since the last provincial elections in April 2013, when the coalition won 78 seats — ranking second after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition — the ISCI seems to be regaining its old stature that once made it the country's largest Shiite political force. Its influence had waned after the death of its former leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, and was further damaged after its electoral setback in 2010, when it only managed to win 20 seats. It later lost some of these seats when the Badr Organization, its de facto military wing, defected to join Maliki’s coalition.

Since then, the ISCI has undergone wide-scale restructuring spearheaded by its young leader, Hakim. This process started by affirming the leadership of Hakim while marginalizing old hawkish guards such as Jalal al-Din al-Saghir. The ISCI also decided to abstain from entering the cabinet, concentrating instead on working through parliament and from outside the executive branch. Hakim has adopted more moderate stances and rhetoric, avoiding becoming directly embroiled in the country's successive political crises. This was part of a strategy to expand its ranks to include those with liberal, secular and nonreligious proclivities, to reposition the group to the left of Maliki’s coalition.

Two main accusations leveled against the ISCI played a role in its decline: first, its administrative failures when it was the largest Shiite bloc and in control of the majority of southern Iraq’s provincial councils, and second, sectarianism. By not assuming executive duties, the ISCI tried to shed its administratively inept and corrupt image. It also adopted a conciliatory rhetoric that focused on concepts such as dialogue, partnership and openness, while avoiding taking any stance that would be construed as supporting sectarian exclusionism. At a time when Maliki’s alliances veered more toward the right, the ISCI seemed intent on taking a more moderate outlook that permitted it to build bridges with other factions.