How Israel’s elections could bring thaw with Syria

If the upcoming Israeli elections produce a less hard-line government, a new chapter in Israeli-Syrian relations could emerge, as Israel would have incentives to stabilize its northern border with Syria, align itself more closely with Washington's regional priorities and explore cooperation with Damascus against Iran.

Some 7.3 million Israelis will head to the polls on Tuesday, Oct. 27, in an election that could reshape the political landscape of one of the Middle East’s most powerful states, with Syria's leadership among those closely watching the outcome. 

Incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a tough challenge from his former military chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot, whose centrist Yashar party is leading the opposition in several polls and who has joined forces with an opposition bloc that includes former Prime Ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, the current opposition leader, who are running on a joint ticket.

Netanyahu and his far-right coalition partners have adopted hard-line positions toward the post-Assad Damascus government, with National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir last year calling for the assassination of President Ahmed al-Sharaa. 

Sharaa appears nonetheless open to engagement with Israel, as a diplomatic thaw could help him consolidate control over Syrian territory.

Aron Lund, a nonresident associate with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, said that while the Syrian government making any move toward formal diplomatic ties with Israel could face domestic and foreign resistance, “a direct bilateral link between the two countries could be useful” to Damascus.

Syria, Lund told Al-Monitor, “seeks to prevent escalation and deter Israeli intrusions, and to avoid unnecessary conflict and misunderstandings.”

If the Israeli elections produce a new government or allow Netanyahu to form a coalition without his current far-right partners, Sharaa could find a more receptive interlocutor in Israel.

What’s in it for Israel?

The fall of the Iran-backed government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 did little to ease Israel’s deep mistrust of Damascus, with Sharaa’s jihadist roots and the presence of Islamist elements in his interim government fueling Israeli security concerns. Over the past two years, Israel has conducted hundreds of airstrikes across Syria on military bases and arms depots in addition to advancing its forces beyond the Golan Heights, which Israel unilaterally annexed, into the UN-monitored buffer zone and seizing Syrian territory adjacent to it.

According to Gabriel Mitchell, a visiting fellow at the German Marshall Fund, while some members of Israel's security establishment feel Sharaa cannot be trusted, others believe “it could be more productive to have a diplomatic opening with Syria.” 

Among the potential gains is an opportunity for the next Israeli government to relatively easily claim a diplomatic win by improving relations with its northern neighbor at a time when Israel remains embroiled in conflicts across the region. “Syria could serve that kind of objective,” Mitchell told Al-Monitor. 

Another incentive for Israel to pursue a more cooperative approach toward Damascus would be to bring its Syria policy more closely in line with Washington’s regional priorities, Mitchell added.

Washington, which has been pushing for an Israeli-Syrian security agreement, brokered five rounds of talks between the two countries from July 2025 to January of this year. While the negotiations opened a communications channel, they failed to resolve the issue of Israeli forces withdrawing from southern Syrian territory seized since Assad's ouster. 

Beyond the diplomatic considerations, an understanding with Damascus could also offer Israel a chance to reduce tensions along its northern frontier at a time when its military remains engaged on several other fronts.

“If you look at Israel's options in the region — Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Iran, and so forth — Syria presents an opportunity for a new opening in the region,” Itamar Rabinovich, a former Israeli ambassador to the United States and former negotiator in Israeli-Syrian talks, told Al-Monitor. 

Cooperation between Syria and Israel could also extend to addressing shared security concerns, particularly in regard to Iran. Relations between Damascus and Tehran have been frozen since Assad's ouster. Syrian Foreign Ministry adviser Mohammad al-Jaffal said last month that restoring diplomatic ties with Iran would require Tehran to reconsider its previous policies toward Syria, respect Syrian sovereignty and rebuild trust.

Such a convergence could also create opportunities for wider regional cooperation against Iranian interests, according to Rabinovich. In Lebanon, efforts are underway to disarm Iran's ally Hezbollah and place all weapons under state control. The Lebanese cabinet banned military and security activities by the group in March, while US-mediated efforts to secure its disarmament in exchange for a gradual Israeli withdrawal from the south remain ongoing. 

“This is a ground for potential trilateral collaboration,” Rabinovich said.

Limits and challenges

Any potential progress in Syrian-Israeli ties is bound to be limited, as analysts broadly agree that Israel’s core security interests in Syria would remain unchanged regardless of who forms the next government. 

Among Israel’s key redlines in Syria are maintaining freedom of military operations in Syrian airspace and preventing the deployment of advanced radar and air defense systems capable of restricting Israeli air operations.

“Israel is unlikely to give up in any way, shape or form, its freedom of mobility over Syrian skies and Syrian airspace,” Mitchell said.

The issue sparked fresh tensions in August, when Israel struck the Abu al-Duhur airbase, in northwestern Syria, roughly 70 kilometers (43 miles) from the Turkish border. Israeli security officials who briefed Al-Monitor at the time said Turkey had planned to deploy radar systems at the base. Both Damascus and Ankara denied the claim.

Tensions between Israel and Turkey are another factor complicating a potential thaw between Damascus and Tel Aviv. Ties between the two Mediterranean powers began to deteriorate after the outbreak of the Gaza war in October 2023. Following the collapse of the Assad regime, tensions spilled over into Syria, where Ankara emerged as a key ally of Sharaa's new government, having previously supported armed Syrian opposition groups.

“Any kind of engagement between Israel and Syria is going to inevitably involve Turkey either in a direct or an indirect way,” said Mitchell. 

Ankara, however, has its own reasons to support a thaw between Israel and Syria. Consolidating Sharaa’s control would help Turkey maintain its influence in Syria, and greater stability could also encourage more Syrian refugees to return home. According to official figures released in July, Turkey continues to host more than 2 million Syrians who fled the civil war that broke out in 2011. The refugees represent a challenge for the government amid widespread anti-refugee sentiment ahead of presidential elections currently scheduled to take place no later than May 2028.

What does a thaw look like?

Given the complexities involved, what would a rapprochement between Israel and Syria actually look like?

Mitchell believes that a new Israeli leadership might be willing to withdraw from some of the territory seized outside the UN-monitored buffer zone in exchange for security guarantees.

In justifying its military presence in southern Syria, Israel cites the need to establish a buffer against potential Islamist threats and protect Syria's Druze minority, which has close religious and familial ties with the Druze community in Israel. In July 2025, clashes between Druze and Bedouins supporting Sharaa in the  southern, majority-Druze province of Suwayda left around 2,000 people dead, according to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

On Oct. 15, Netanyahu revealed that he had personally called Sharaa during the fighting, claiming that his intervention had helped stop the killing. During subsequent US-mediated negotiations, Israel demanded a humanitarian corridor to Suwayda, but Damascus rejected the proposal as a violation of Syrian sovereignty, Al-Monitor reported at the time. 

“If the elections produce a different Israeli government, the new Israeli government could take a different line, and a new relationship between Israel and Syria could become a practical matter,” Rabinovich said.

Even if Netanyahu remains in power and forms a new coalition without his current far-right partners, the potential benefits of improving ties with Syria could encourage a thaw with Damascus, according to the analysts.

 According to Mitchell, “Netanyahu historically has been very flexible, especially when it comes to aligning with American interests.”