TEHRAN — The scale and scope of regime violence against protesters in Iran appeared to compel President Donald Trump to threaten military intervention in the country.
According to Gulf and Western officials cited by Reuters, the US president was close to opting for military action against Tehran over the crackdown, just seven months after the United States made the unprecedented decision to bomb three Iranian nuclear facilities.
But within days, Trump appeared to backtrack on some of his threats, perhaps searching for an exit ramp. A flurry of intense diplomacy involving Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and Egypt possibly persuaded the Trump administration to pump the breaks, according to reports. To be sure, Trump told reporters Friday that no other players affected his decision-making. "Nobody convinced me. I convinced myself," he said.
Publicly, Trump said the killings were easing. Privately, regional allies reportedly warned that a strike on Iran would risk detonating a far wider crisis, one that could ultimately harm US interests rather than advance them.
The intervention by these Arab states was driven less by humanitarian concern than by the strategic, economic and political realities informing the Gulf’s view of Iran.
The most immediate concern driving Gulf capitals’ efforts to shape Trump’s Iran policy is energy. Any US military action against Iran would raise the risk of retaliation against oil and gas infrastructure across the Gulf, either directly or through allied armed groups. Even limited strikes could rattle markets, disrupt shipping lanes and make energy prices skyrocket.
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, in particular, have spent years positioning themselves as anchors of global energy stability. Riyadh’s economic transformation agenda and Doha’s role as a leading liquefied natural gas supplier both depend on predictability. A regional war — or even a prolonged standoff — could shatter that narrative overnight.
Qatar and Iran, which enjoy constructive diplomatic ties, also co-manage the South Pars/North Dome gas field.
Oil prices already experienced volatility this week amid fears of supply disruptions if the United States were to strike one of the world’s most critical energy-producing regions.
For Gulf officials, destabilizing Iran would not be a contained event. They see Tehran retaining the ability to threaten US facilities, shipping routes and energy infrastructure across the region. For states hosting American bases, the risk is not abstract: Retaliation could land on their own soil, as was the case when Iran bombed Qatar's Al Udeid Air Base last summer in retaliation for US strikes.
Beyond energy, Gulf states may prefer a weakened Islamic Republic to the uncertainty of what might replace it.
For all the decades of rivalry, Iran under its current system remains a known commodity. Its red lines, internal constraints and patterns of regional behavior are familiar. A post-Islamic Republic Iran — particularly one emerging from a non-monolithic protest movement — would be far less predictable.
The emergence of a secular, democratic system could trigger the lifting of crippling international sanctions and open Iran’s vast economy to Western investment, potentially giving US companies a major foothold in markets long closed off. For Gulf monarchies that have spent years positioning themselves as the region’s primary hubs for capital, trade and innovation, that prospect is not entirely welcome.
There is also the question of precedent. A successful popular uprising in Iran, ushering in a pluralistic political system, could resonate across the Gulf. Even in highly stable and prosperous states, the symbolic power of mass protests toppling a deeply entrenched non-elected establishment would be difficult to contain, making stability, in the eyes of Gulf leaders, a safer bet than transformation.
Israel factor and regional balance
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