When reporters in the Knesset asked Blue and White party leader Benny Gantz Dec. 2 what he thought about Defense Minister Naftali Bennett’s plan to build a new Jewish neighborhood in Hebron, he answered, “We need to hear the opinions of all the professional bodies dealing with this issue. Once we hear the professional opinions of the various defense organizations and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, we can present a genuine position.”

It is quite possible that Gantz realized that this is a ridiculous and dangerous plan, which must never be implemented, but why say so? Instead, Gantz opted for the army formula. He knows that Likud supporters in his Knesset faction and among his voters might actually support the Hebron settlement idea. He understands that he would be much better off if the Israel Defense Forces (and Gantz knows what they think about issues like this) end up being the “bad guys” that take the idea down. At the same time, it is also possible that he does not fully realize how problematic this idea is. Maybe he does not remember the decision made in 1968 to establish the settlement of Kiryat Arba outside of Hebron to prevent friction between Jewish and Muslim extremists in the City of the Patriarchs. In any event, he may not have acted like a real leader, but that is how they act in the “cockpit,” the term used to describe the four heads of the Blue and White party: Don’t say anything so as not to cause any damage to the very fragile common denominator uniting the party — no matter how low the bar is.

The die has yet to be cast. It is not yet clear whether Israel will be holding its third election in a year, or whether Yisrael Beitenu Chairman Avigdor Liberman will return to his old haunts and rejoin the right-wing, ultra-Orthodox coalition. The option of a center-left government seems to be off the table, while the option of a unity government is running into more and more difficulties. But one thing is becoming increasingly clear: Blue and White may have been the surprise of the elections for the 21st and 22nd Knesset. It may even have won the same number of seats as the Likud and more. Yet it is still a hollow party with internal divisions that leave it paralyzed.

This consequence was inevitable. This artificial merger of people who are clearly on the left with people who are clearly on the right could only result in a very low common denominator, i.e., removing Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister. That's why even surprising proposals — such as a government headed by Netanyahu for half a year, to be replaced by a unity government headed by Benny Gantz — were rejected by the party’s leaders. They did not reach their decision because they could not come to terms with the idea of Netanyahu remaining in office, even if it only would be for a few more months. (After all, even if there is a new election, he would remain prime minister for many more months, until the next government is formed.) They made their decision because any agreement to keep Netanyahu in office, no matter for how long, is devastating to the one principle agreed on by all factions in the party.