BEIRUT — As 2025 draws to a close, Hezbollah finds itself militarily weakened, territorially constrained, yet fundamentally intact. The group has largely withdrawn its overt military presence south of the Litani River under the terms of the November 2024 US-brokered ceasefire with Israel, allowing the Lebanese army to expand its footprint in the border region. But this pullback has stopped well short of full disarmament, underscoring the limits of both international pressure and the Lebanese state’s capacity to enforce a nationwide monopoly on weapons.

The ceasefire agreement called for the dismantling of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure south of the Litani — about 30 kilometers (18 miles) from the border with Israel —, not the elimination of the group’s broader arsenal. While Washington has sought to leverage Hezbollah’s battlefield losses to push for complete disarmament, Lebanese authorities have proceeded cautiously, prioritizing stability and avoiding direct confrontation with a group that has explicitly rejected surrendering its weapons. As a result, Hezbollah has adjusted its posture rather than abandoned its core deterrent strategy, preserving much of its military capability north of the river as the year ends.

This uneasy equilibrium sets the stage for a far more consequential test in 2026. The next phase of the Lebanese government’s weapons consolidation plan — extending north of the Litani into Hezbollah’s political and social heartlands — will confront higher political costs, deeper sectarian sensitivities and a sharper risk of internal friction. Whether Hezbollah can be further contained without triggering domestic instability, and whether the state can translate territorial control into lasting authority, will define Lebanon’s security landscape in the year ahead.

How it began