There’s no need to attribute any cynical or dark motives to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in order to conclude that Israel’s assassination of Islamic Jihad senior Bahaa Abu el-Atta on Nov. 12 would make the possibility of Blue and White leader Benny Gantz forming a narrow government much less likely than it was on the eve of this targeted assassination.

It is no big secret that the defense establishment provides Israel’s decision-makers with a list of physical and human targets for elimination. Nor is it a secret that there is a lively discussion between professionals and decision-makers before any final decision to embark on such a mission. Virtually all the human targets on the list are people plotting to hurt Israel and Israelis. Furthermore, it is highly likely that with them out of the picture, Israel would suffer less losses and the level of threat could diminish. But there are always other considerations before the decision is made to embark on what is, effectively, a sort of an extrajudicial execution, as compared to killing people in war. One such factor involves estimates of the intensity of the response by the injured party. Another involves the secondary damage that could be caused by attacking the target. Many “targets” have never been hit because decision-makers determined that the cost of the operation exceeds its benefits, or because they did not want to risk harming large numbers of people, who happened to be in the proximity of the target of the attack.

This could be why, as Yisreal Beitenu leader Avigdor Liberman claims, he suggested targeting Abu el-Atta a year ago. But Netanyahu refused — of course. (Mention of discussions between the prime minister and his defense minister are extraordinarily rare, and the content is not usually released at all.) The prime minister had second thoughts about his decision on two separate occasions. The first was right before this September’s election when Netanyahu saw where he stood in the polls and decided that a military operation could help him. The second happened in the past few days, when he saw that the possibility of a minority government with outside support from the Arab Joint List was beginning to take shape, and he feared that he could lose his job not only for half a term — in a unity government with a rotation agreement — but for the entire time the new government is in office.

Justification for killing a target is always available. It was there when the assassination was suggested (by Liberman), and it was there the second time, too (prevented by Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit, who worried that it could lead to a full-blown conflict without first convening the Cabinet). And it was available again last week. Abu el-Atta planned attacks against us. He was hardly innocent. The briefing provided to Gantz right before the operation was a calculated move and a major success, at least as far as Netanyahu was concerned. In theory, he was not obliged to inform Gantz, because Gantz is not head of the opposition. To onlookers, however, Netanyahu was being very fair-minded in his decision to update his political rival. He may have even received some operational advice from former Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gantz, not to mention his eager support.