Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan reached several agreements in Sochi Sept. 17 to stabilize the situation in Idlib, thus reducing the risk of a full-fledged assault on this opposition stronghold. But those agreements did not exclude the possibility of an assault in the near future. The Sochi memorandum outlined, in general, the actions each side should undertake to avoid escalation. During the consultations that followed the Russian-Turkish summit, representatives of both countries tried to propose amendments to the agreement and to enforce their own vision of specific points.

However, at this stage, Moscow and Ankara have found common ground on several points of the Sochi agreements — something that Putin has recently emphasized. On Oct. 3, during a meeting with Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, Putin claimed it was very likely that large-scale fighting in Syria could be avoided. Putin said the Russian side “acts in solidarity with our Turkish partners, who fulfill their part of obligations.”

Nevertheless, the implementation of the memorandum on Idlib will stoke further controversies between Russia and Turkey, requiring extra effort and endurance to overcome them. Russia and Turkey both aim to carry out the agreements based on their own needs and therefore see the results differently.

Turkey, for its part, is willing to gradually impose its “protectorate” over Idlib the same way it has with the areas of northern Aleppo covered by the Turkish “security umbrella” as a result of the Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch operations. By supporting the opposition's control over particular areas, Turkey has the opportunity to lead the resolution process alongside Russia. If Bashar al-Assad's regime had reclaimed Idlib before reconciliation was complete, Turkey would have been left out of the resolution process and the militants under its patronage would have been silenced, losing any claim to representation in the transitional administration. According to prominent Syria researcher Hassan Hassan, since the expulsion of Kurdish militias from Afrin, Idlib has become even more beneficial for Turkey. This is due to its proximity to Kurdish towns in northwestern Syria, which provides another layer of security for Turkish-backed forces and helps create a contiguous sphere of influence for Ankara. Thus, it is crucial for Turkey to prevent the disintegration of the Idlib de-escalation zone and to fully maintain its control over it.