In recent days, the Palestinians have returned to launching rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israeli communities. On Dec. 11, Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system intercepted a long-range rocket that was fired toward the town of Ashkelon. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reacted with relative restraint and only shelled a few Hamas targets in Gaza to avoid being pulled into an armed skirmish. But the measured response did not achieve its goal. Only 24 hours later, another long-range rocket was fired at Ashkelon.

The firing of long-range rockets requires relatively complex deployments; it cannot be done in hiding, far from the eyes of Hamas’ security force. It is also doubtful that small Salafist organizations have the required technical abilities to launch these rockets. Instead, the chances are that Hamas’ military wing or Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s Al-Quds Brigades — groups that the IDF frequently labels “Hamas’ operational contractors” — are behind the rockets.

The assessment is that this week’s launches were carried out by members of Islamic Jihad, while Hamas stood by and did not stop them. This is despite the fact that the Hamas heads are not interested in another war at the moment — no more than the Israelis.

True, on Dec. 7, Hamas political bureau head Ismail Haniyeh called on his people to begin a new intifada, in response to President Donald Trump’s Jerusalem proclamation. But there is a difference between a grass-roots uprising in the form of individual attackers (which are not attributed to Hamas and are not likely to invoke military retaliation from Israel) and a broad-based military confrontation that may well endanger the Hamas regime again. As I wrote in Al-Monitor Dec. 11, Israel’s evaluation is that Hamas wants a small-scale uprising in which civilians initiate acts of terror while the movement’s leadership sits on the fence and gives support from afar — in words, not in actions. This is what Hamas did during the individual terror wave that erupted in October 2015.