Notwithstanding conventional arguments that Russia’s intervention in Syria has sharply increased its influence in the Middle East, Moscow may ultimately find that its gains do not outweigh its losses from the venture. Much will depend on whether, when and how Syria’s civil war ends.

It is unsurprising that many would expect — or perhaps even fear — greater Russian influence in the region in the immediate aftermath of Moscow’s first attacks in Syria. After all, Russia’s airstrikes in Syria are its first combat deployment away from its borders in decades. President Vladimir Putin’s decision to assume a direct military role in defending the Syrian government was decisive and even bold. Nevertheless, history has often demonstrated that these initial reactions fail to consider real-world complexities and long-term consequences. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 is a good example of this. After the “shock and awe” of Washington’s rapid defeat of Iraqi forces subsided, the challenges for US policy only grew and America’s regional reputation sagged.

So far, Russia’s intervention in Syria has had five principal benefits: shifting some domestic international attention from Ukraine to Syria; increasing the credibility of any potential future threats to use force; demonstrating Russia’s advanced military capabilities in a highly visible manner; strengthening Moscow’s leverage over the Syrian government in absolute terms and relative to Iran; and bolstering Russia’s claim to a major role in shaping a political settlement in Syria.

These benefits are not inconsequential. Yet they are not overwhelming, either. Internationally, while Washington and some major European capitals are open to working with Moscow to end the fighting in Syria, none seems inclined to “trade” positions on Ukraine in the process. Domestically, Syria can be a successful distraction only so long as it is a successful war — something largely outside Russia’s control, since its forces are in a supporting rather than a leading role.