The historic political framework between Iran and the world powers April 2 in Lausanne, Switzerland, on Iran's nuclear program — to be developed into a comprehensive agreement by the end of June — has indeed changed the entire landscape.

After more than a decade of roller-coaster talks, mostly marked with failure, both sides have finally arrived at a formula that would assure the international community of the strictly peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities, and terminate all unilateral and multilateral economic and financial nuclear-related sanctions imposed on Iran.

This historic overall understanding — whose quite complex details involving a whole lot of parameters and nuances to be negotiated and articulated in the form of legally binding documents before the deadline — has been rightly lauded by almost all as the framework for a diplomatic resolution of a seemingly intractable international problem, which, if left unresolved with inevitable further festering and complication, could have led to a possible new war in the Middle East with all its catastrophic consequences. US President Barack Obama, in an unmistakable effort to convince the colorful doubters and opponents of the superiority of the diplomatic recourse, clearly referred to the option of war as one of the three possible avenues for resolving the nuclear impasse.

While the political framework reflects the commitment, hard work, sound judgment and, above all, political will of all the parties involved — Iran as well as and the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany — it has been the direct interaction between Iran and the United States, the main two protagonists, particularly since September 2013, that has helped steer the process of negotiation toward the positive outcome. In a detailed discussion in my book “Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace" — covering more than 30 years of deeply felt and entrenched mutual distrust, hostility, name-calling, tension, tit-for-tat negative policies, measures and actions aimed at harming the other side — I have tried to depict an objective picture of the state of relations, or lack thereof, between the two capitals, including the numerous missed opportunities at rapprochement and ultimate detente between them. This particular aspect of the matter has not escaped the attention and eyes of pundits and keen Iran observers, including William Burns who has been personally involved in the nuclear talks for years.