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National reconciliation in Iraq remains elusive

Since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the national reconciliation project has been subject to several interpretations, as the separation between the innocent and “those who have Iraqi blood on their hands” is still ambiguous.

Iyad Allawi (L), Usama al-Nujaifi (2nd L), Iraq's supreme court judge Midhat al-Mahmoud (2nd R) and Nuri al-Maliki (R) stand together during a swearing-in at the parliament headquarters in Baghdad September 8, 2014. Iraq's parliament approved a new government headed by Haider al-Abadi as prime minister on Monday night, in a bid to rescue Iraq from collapse, with sectarianism and Arab-Kurdish tensions on the rise. The parliament approved for the ceremonial posts of vice presidents the last prime minister al-
Iyad Allawi (L), Osama al-Nujaifi (2nd L), Iraq's supreme court judge Midhat al-Mahmoud (2nd R) and Nouri al-Maliki (R) stand together during a swearing-in at the parliament headquarters in Baghdad, Sept. 8, 2014. — REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani

The latest statement on the “national reconciliation” in Iraq was made by Vice President Iyad Allawi on March 2, 2015, in which he noted, “A true reconciliation should include all parties except for the ones who have Iraqi blood on their hands.”

This expression has been repeated several times by Allawi himself, as well as different political, intellectual, tribal and religious leaders since 2003. It has been repeatedly associated with ambiguity concerning who should and should not be included in the reconciliation. Strangely enough, despite holding hundreds of meetings and conferences on the issue, no party has been able since 2003 to form a clear legal basis to determine who has Iraqi blood on their hands and who is innocent.

The concept of national reconciliation was proposed by Iraqi politicians in the first months of the US occupation of Iraq in 2003. Back then, it concerned specific parties such as the former Baathists, the former Iraqi army officers and the security apparatus members of the former Saddam Hussein regime. This concept sought to resolve the repercussions of the decision made by US civil administrator Paul Bremer to disband the Iraqi army — which some say partially led to security instability — the security apparatus and other institutions.

Reaching reconciliation at that early stage was possible. It could have been based on separating the pillars of the Saddam regime from the security and military institutions, and on reintegrating former Baathists into society.

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