Turkey’s judiciary held controversial elections Oct. 12 to determine the new members of the Higher Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). The main issue of discussion before and after the elections was the number of “Gulenist candidates.” Newspapers claimed ahead of the election that out of 15,000 judges and prosecutors 3,000 to 5,000 were Gulenists. After the vote we were told that “only two Gulenists got elected to the HSYK” and front-page headlines trumpeted “the defeat of the community.”

The “defeat” may have upset many members and sympathizers of the community, led by Muslim scholar and preacher Fethullah Gulen, but if they try to see the issue from another perspective they will realize that the cloud has a big silver lining. Because any perception of the community wielding disproportionate clout in the judiciary is harmful both to the community itself and Turkish democracy.

Let’s first recall how we got here. The Turkish public became widely acquainted with the Gulen community in the 1990s, though its roots date back to the 1970s. The community won a reputation as a civil society movement running highly successful schools both in Turkey and abroad and promoting intercommunal tolerance, dialogue and understanding. Teachers, community volunteers and pro-dialogue activists were the movement’s embodiment in public perception at the time.

However, a new perception — of “Gulenist prosecutors and police” — emerged in the mid-2000s. Those cadres, backed robustly by Gulenist media, spearheaded the landmark Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases in what they clearly saw as an epic struggle to dismantle the Turkish military’s tutelage. What they achieved in terms of “touching the untouchables” was indeed remarkable. Yet, as the cases proceeded, they became increasingly marred by excesses, legal breaches and even allegations of fabricated evidence, which damaged not only the credibility of the trials but the image of the Gulen community as well.