As Egypt’s presidential race starts with a few slow notes, terrorist attacks persistently sound loud percussions in the background. Three explosions rocked the vicinity of Cairo University on April 2, killing two people, including a police brigadier general, and injuring five. Following the incident, the university's administration decided to allow police onto the campus while the government drafted new anti-terror legislation. If ratified by Adly Mansour, Egypt’s interim president, the new law would introduce tough punishments, including the death penalty, for anyone convicted of committing terrorist attacks or establishing or joining a “terrorist organization.” The law also increases the number of judicial districts dedicated to handling trials related to terrorism to ensure “speedy” trials. But can mere legislation, tougher punishments and tight security plans be sufficient for Egypt to see the light at — or even near — the end of the tunnel of terrorism?

A few weeks after the removal of Mohammed Morsi, then-Minister of Defense Abdel Fattah al-Sisi demanded that Egyptians give the army and police a popular “mandate” (through mass protests) to confront “potential” terrorism. Since then, thousands of Islamists have been detained, killed or injured in confrontations with the police, army or civilian supporters of Sisi. Terrorist attacks by Islamist militants have left hundreds of security forces dead or injured in just a few months. Many activists and critics blame the government and Sisi personally for the escalation of violence.

On Aug. 14, 2013, the Rabia al-Adawiya and Nahda encampments were disbanded 50 days after they began, with several hundred dead. That day marked a new level of violence in the country. Could it have been avoided? Perhaps. But the more important question for Sisi is: What is his plan to end this bloody cycle of violence and terrorism?

Economic recovery and balancing foreign currency cash flows need security and stability. Should he become Egypt’s president, Sisi has a number of choices to achieve these goals: either reach out to Islamists with a political reconciliation package, or eradicate militant Islamists while designing an economic recovery plan. The Muslim Brotherhood is known for its ability to make political deals, but even if its leaders conclude it is in the organization's best interest to return to the political process — either accepting or pretending to accept the new ground rules — there will always remain a sufficient number of suicidal hard-liners who would wage a war of attrition against the state. The third choice would be a blend of the first two: reaching out to “moderate” Islamists to deprive them of valuable resources and political cover, while weakening their logistical and fighting capabilities.