Years ago, I was a guest for a few months in the home of a Jewish family in Pennsylvania in the United States. The family members maintained a basic connection with Israel and Judaism, and occasionally would attend services at a Reform temple. It was in the kitchen of this family that I first encountered a product called kosher imitation bacon bits. My hosts explained to me that “it’s almost like the real thing,” and since they did not bring pork into the house, they would spice their omelets with those artificial crumbs with an industrial taste. As someone who grew up in a totally secular household in which we ate omelets with real bacon on Shabbat, I wondered about this use of a substitute for a product that one could do without.

I was reminded of the bacon-substitute story from my youth this week, when I followed the details of the first meeting between the Israeli and Greek governments that took place in Jerusalem on Oct. 8. Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras arrived from Athens with a respectable delegation of eight ministers to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and a series of ministers in his government. It was officially announced that 10 agreements were signed at this meeting, agreements regarding cooperation in various spheres between the governments. The highlight was the announcement regarding strategic-security cooperation.

The Israeli and Greek air forces will carry out a joint exercise next week. But this will not be the first time that Israeli fighter planes will fly in the Peloponnese skies. In the last three years, Greece has given Israel a strategic hinterland in the air and the sea — territory for training drills and army maneuvers that are so lacking here. In September, the chief of staff of the Greek army, Gen. Michalis Kostarakos, visited Israel for the first time. He walked down the corridors of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) headquarters and was introduced to Israeli officers — the same officers who maintained close professional and personal relationships with Turkish counterparts. Some of those Turkish officers lost again this week, on Oct. 9, in Ankara’s court of appeals, which confirmed the draconian punishments imposed on them in the “Ergenekon case.”

No one in the Israeli corridors of power denies the fact that the ties between Israel and Greece tightened greatly after Israel’s strategic alliance with Turkey began to fall apart. The height of the process was, of course, the 2010 Marmara flotilla affair in which Turkish activists were killed. Sometimes it even appears that Israel brandishes its tightening alliance with Greece — "the historical adversary" — as a way to defy Turkey. Another example is the energy project to transport Israeli gas via the Republic of Cyprus (here it is called “Greek Cyprus,” and in Turkey it is called “Southern Cyprus”) and from there to Greece. This initiative is 10 times more expensive than simply transporting gas via Turkey, but is another "stick" used by Israel in the face of Ankara’s ongoing hostility. A source involved in the affair told me this week that as of now, “the economic consideration will not be the deciding factor. We have to distinguish between the ideal and the reality.”