All eyes are now focused on the opening of the Geneva II conference, which Moscow and Washington are trying to convene sometime next month. But it is important for the success of this effort that hopes for Geneva II do not follow the same sorry trajectory as the unrealistic expectations of an Assad defeat.

Geneva I was born in a period defined by widespread, if illusory anticipation of a complete military victory by the opposition. The communique issued by the Action Group on Syria on June 30, 2012, said all the right things. It noted that “Action Group members are committed to the sovereignty, independence, national unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. They are determined to work urgently and intensively to bring about an end to the violence and human rights abuses, and to facilitate the launch of a Syrian-led political process leading to a transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and enables them independently and democratically to determine their own future.”

These encouraging words, signaling the creation of a diplomatic “common space” shared by the United Nations, United States, European Union, League of Arab States, China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar could not be translated into effective diplomacy as long as the alluring prospect of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's military defeat continued to seduce policymakers in the West and among the opposition's regional supporters.

For almost six months now, Russia and the United States have labored to create a consensual diplomatic structure that can tame and limit the increasingly brutal — if strategically indecisive — war on the ground. Even if Geneva proves stillborn — a very real possibility — the conflict has nevertheless been irrevocably transformed. The context in which all parties are making decisions has changed. On the one hand, arming the rebels is now becoming a function of the effort to improve the opposition’s position at the negotiating table rather than in anticipation of an improbable, if not impossible, military victory on the battlefield. On the other hand, regime supporters have been disabused of the hope for absolute victory and are looking to elections scheduled for 2014.