Israeli security forces have noticed increased efforts by Hamas over the last few months to restore and reinvigorate its operational infrastructure in the West Bank. These include the resurrection of cells under the control of the movement’s military wing in Gaza and the establishment of a command hierarchy similar to what it had there during the second intifada (2000-05). Assessments that the West Bank is heating up have gained momentum in the wake of recent events.

On March 19, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed Omar Abu-Laila, who two days before had shot and killed Sergeant First Class Gal Keidan and Rabbi Achiad Ettinger in an attack near the Ariel settlement. On March 20, IDF soldiers shot to death two Palestinian youths after they tossed explosive devices from a vehicle at Israeli troops near Joseph’s Tomb, in Nablus. In addition, at the entrance to the village of al-Khadr, near Bethlehem, IDF soldiers killed a Palestinian youth whose family later said that he was not involved in any hostile activities and had been killed in cold blood. The IDF claimed that the young man had been throwing rocks at passing vehicles and says that the incident is under investigation. Even before this last incident, the various Palestinian factions had already called for a “day of rage” on the West Bank on March 22 and encouraged Palestinian youths to demonstrate and clash with IDF troops.

According to IDF data, there were fewer terror attacks in the West Bank in 2018 (87) than in 2017 (97) and 2016 (169). There was also a slight drop in the number of Israeli casualties as a result of such attacks in 2018 (16) compared to in 2017 (20) and 2016 (17). Most attacks in 2018 were by groups of young people acting without organizational oversight or direction, though the leaderships of Hamas and Islamic Jihad provided some with moral support. As a rule, the attacks launched over the last few years involved no support, training, guidance, or equipment from Hamas' military wing.

There has been no comprehensive overhaul or reorganization of Hamas' operational infrastructure in the West Bank since the end of the second intifada. Every so often, on important anniversaries, Hamas' leadership has called for a new intifada in the cities of the West Bank, but without any active involvement by the movement’s military wing. There are many different reasons for this, but the main one seems to be successful cooperation between the IDF and the security forces of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in thwarting attacks. The PA regards Hamas as an enemy striving to overthrow President Mahmoud Abbas' government, which means that it has two distinct reasons for preventing such violence: to avert an escalation in the struggle against Israel in the West Bank and to keep Hamas from reestablishing itself in the West Bank for fear it could lash out at the PA itself.