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Analysis

Can Iraq PM rein in Kataib Hezbollah without triggering armed conflict?

Iraq's Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi
Iraq's Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi (C) looks on during the family photo during the 52nd session of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Council of Foreign Ministers in Baghdad on Oct. 17, 2026. — Ahmad Al-Rubaye / AFP via Getty Images

AMMAN — More than 40 days after the US-led coalition's withdrawal from Iraq, Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s government may be inching closer to armed conflict with Iran-backed factions in the country, including the one widely known as the most secretive and powerful: Kataib Hezbollah.

On Nov. 7, Zaidi ordered the cancellation of service contracts held by three companies at Mosul International Airport, citing their unspecified “links to armed groups.” He then directed that the contracts be offered to international companies.

The affected companies and their contracts, the Iraqi News Agency reported, are Sky Plus, for leasing counters; Sama al-Matar, for operating a parking lot; and Al-Faisal al-Shamikh, for taxi service.

Kataib Hezbollah (KH), one of the Iran-backed militias, and its political wing, Harakat Huqooq (the Rights Movement), responded with a media campaign seeking to discredit Zaidi with accusations about how he built his wealth and his alleged past support for Iran-based factions.  

KH or another faction linked to it may also have been involved in a Nov. 8 attack on Khor Mor, a major gas field in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. No one has claimed responsibility, but Iran-linked armed factions have conducted multiple attacks on the Kurdistan Region in recent years. Iranian dissident groups, including their armed wings, have long been based in the Kurdistan Region and the regional government is seen as close to the US, with the largest US consulate in the world in Erbil. Additionally, territory disputed between the Kurdistan Region and the central government in Iraq continues to cause tension between the two, with security gaps in some areas.

According to Kurdistan Regional Government figures, Iran has launched more than 1,000 drone and missile attacks against the Kurdistan Region since Feb. 28.

The gas field was mentioned in a Nov. 7 Telegram statement by KH security chief Abu Mujahid al-Assaf: “We do not want to air dirty laundry in public, nor open the files of [Khor Mor gas field] and the incitement to target it for the purpose of extorting the UAE; for whoever’s house is made of glass should not throw stones at people.” 

The Khor Mor gas field is jointly operated by UAE-based Dana Gas. The field has suffered several attacks since 2022 and Kurdish officials have often blamed Iran-linked militias. Regional media quoted two Iraqi security forces as saying that the drones were launched from areas east of the Iraqi town of Tuz Khurmatu in central government territory.

KH, which has pledged loyalty to Iran’s supreme leader, was created in the post-2003 period with support and training from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

It existed for a decade before the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) were established in June 2014 to fight the Islamic State and drew many of its members from Shia factions that had fought the US forces in Iraq for years and in Syria on the side of the former Assad regime. The current number of registered active PMU personnel is over 200,000.

Three PMU brigades were drawn from KH, which continues to be problematic for Zaidi and others who would like to see a state monopoly on arms and less influence exerted by Iraq’s eastern neighbor over armed factions. KH has vowed to abide by an Oct. 31 directive attributed to Iran's supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, ordering all armed forces answering to him to be prepared to respond to any attack on Iran “immediately, effectively and with no geographical restriction."

How armed factions in Iraq might respond if called upon depends on their strategic location, control of territory and whether Iraqi security forces are able and willing to counter their actions.

Borders and Babil

Iran-backed armed factions have long tried to control key strategic locations in the region, notably both sides of the Iraqi-Syrian border crossing at al-Qaim–al-Bukamal before the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 and Beirut’s international airport.

The PMU does not have a clear unified hierarchy and is divided along ideological and factional lines. Its chairman, Abu Fadak al-Mohammadawi, is a former secretary general of KH. Of the three brigades within the state-sponsored PMU comprising KH fighters, two are deployed to the Iraqi-Syrian border area in the Al-Qaim district and one to Jurf al-Nasr, formerly and more commonly known as Jurf al-Sakhar.

On Nov. 11, Parliament Speaker Haibat al-Halbousi ordered the establishment of a committee to investigate claims made in an Iraqi intelligence report alleging that oil smuggled — possibly by KH, given that it controls the area — from Jurf al-Nasr had been transported to Iran and then onward to Afghanistan. The proceeds may have been used to fund the militias or support Iran in other ways.  

According to close observers and some government officials, Jurf al-Nasr, south of Baghdad, has been outside central government control since 2014. Its original Sunni residents remain displaced after being pushed out during anti-IS operations by Shia armed factions. The factions have vowed never to relinquish control of the area, citing its proximity to Karbala, a major pilgrimage destination for Shia Muslims.

Over the years, many have called on successive Iraqi governments to take action against Shiite armed groups operating outside of state control and investigate what happened to the many people believed to have been killed or disappeared by these groups during the 2014–17 war against the Islamic State (IS).

In a 2018 interview with this reporter in Baghdad, former parliament speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi, while governor of Anbar, said that he had asked Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi to tell him what had happened at the Al Razaza checkpoint, reportedly manned at that time by Kataib Hezbollah, where, in 2015, hundreds of local Sunnis fleeing toward Baghdad from IS in Anbar were forcibly disappeared. The checkpoint was located on the border between Sunni-majority Anbar and Shiite-majority Karbala.

In 2016, Abadi issued orders recognizing the PMU as an official state security force. He subsequently pushed for greater integration of its units into a more formal military structure.

Human rights organizations have blamed Kataib Hezbollah for the disappearances, while investigative reports by foreign media outlets have published video evidence and survivor testimony leading to the same conclusion.

“He said that these [armed] groups are not on the official list [of PMUs],” said Halbousi, who remains a key Sunni Arab political figure in Iraq. “So where do they come from? The moon? I want to know who is on the ground.”

“Nobody can tell us where they are,” he continued at that time, in reference to the hundreds of people who remained missing over a decade later. “But we have heard that they are in Jurf al-Sakhar," in neighboring Babil province. Halbousi said that he believed that Kataib Hezbollah was holding the hundreds of people who had disappeared, or at least knew what had happened to them.

Media campaign as prelude to military strike?

Zaidi’s cancellation of the Mosul airport contracts and the circulation of an arrest warrant for the son of Kataib Hezbollah's leader, “alongside an active media campaign to delegitimize KH, appear to be part of an asymmetric campaign by PM al-Zaidi to isolate the group and force it to submit," Hamdi Malik, founder of the Iraqi Monitor and an associate fellow at the Washington Institute, told Al-Monitor.

“KH clearly believes al-Zaidi is behind this campaign,” he added, “hence its daily attacks against him in the media and parliament, including demands to investigate his wealth, accusations that he was involved in the attack on the Khor Mor gas field to blackmail the UAE and claims that he donated money to supply drones to Iraqi militias for attacks against US and Israeli targets.”

Although the June 2027 deadline for Iran-backed armed factions to hand over their weapons or face the consequences remains months away, many say they doubt that negotiations or any feasible concessions offered in exchange would result in the factions peacefully relinquishing their weapons.

Government officials hope that the three main factions that have not yet agreed to hand over their weapons will do so by June, an Iraqi official told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity. “But, personally, I don’t think they’re going to give up their weapons, or land under their control, without being militarily forced to do so.”

“Without these things, they’re no one,” the official said. “So why would they give up the only thing that makes them ‘somebody’? I think we’re going to have to fight them at some point.”

Politics as a preferable source of power

According to several officials interviewed by Al-Monitor in Baghdad and elsewhere over the past decade, successive Iraqi governments have tried to reduce the power of armed factions by coaxing them into aligning their fate more closely with that of the state. This has been attempted in part by encouraging them to become more openly involved in politics by establishing political parties and fielding candidates in elections.

KH is linked to a political party that already takes part in elections. However, few Iraqis believe that the most hardline Iran-backed armed factions, or at least Kataib Hezbollah, will be willing to relinquish territory under their control and all the power that comes with it. Or, at least, not without a fight.

Whether official Iraqi military and security forces — many of whose members have family or other ties to individuals in the Iran-backed factions — will be willing and able to engage in such a fight is an issue that Zaidi and those advising him will have to assess and address.

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