Turkey's Libya maritime win no guarantee for Saddam Hifter's presidential ambitions
Turkey’s push to broker Libyan reunification has gained momentum with the ratification of a maritime deal, but political divisions and competing regional interests could limit Ankara’s influence.
The Oct. 20 ratification by the Libyan House of Representatives of a controversial 2019 maritime deal that it had long rejected — one that effectively recognizes Turkey’s maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean at the expense of Greece, Cyprus and Egypt — is being widely hailed as proof of Turkey's inexorable rise as a regional superpower.
Analysts caution, however, that Libya’s political divisions and the competing agendas of regional stakeholders will ultimately expose the limits of Turkey’s leverage and that talk of imminent reunification brokered by Turkey may well prove immature.
Speculation of a breakthrough grew amid news that Ankara was hosting a meeting on Friday between Saddam Hifter, the deputy commander of the eastern-backed Libyan National Army (LNA) who was instrumental in getting the maritime accord approved, and Abdussalam Zubi, the acting defense minister of the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity.
The pair were expected to discuss an agreement to unify their two militaries, part of a broader effort to end Libya’s division.
The energy-rich North African nation remains split between the internationally recognized government led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west and the Benghazi-based administration led by Hifter’s father, Khalifa Hifter, a former CIA asset and warlord.
Saddam’s ambitions, US neglect
After years of overt hostility driven by Turkey’s game-changing military support for Tripoli’s forces in its war against the LNA, Ankara began engaging with the Hifters. A UN-brokered ceasefire in 2020 facilitated Ankara’s push to sideline Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates and extend Turkey’s influence over the whole of Libya.
The contacts became public in 2024 when the younger Hifter met with Turkey’s defense minister and army chief in Ankara. Turkey’s spy chief Ibrahim Kalin traveled to Benghazi last year and in June. He was in Tripoli meeting with Dbeibah to discuss unification on the same day the Benghazi-aligned House of Representatives unanimously voted in favor of the delimitation deal that draws a line southeast of the Greek island of Crete, leaving it within Turkey’s territorial waters.
Saddam Hifter's enthusiasm for the thaw is widely believed to be driven in large measure by his personal ambitions. He would like to secure Turkey’s backing to become president of a new executive presidential council under the terms of the power-sharing scheme that was crafted by Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s senior advisor for Middle Eastern and African Affairs. According to the plan that became public in February, the Dbeibah family would retain control of the premiership.
With the United States distracted by the Iran conflict, Turkey is widely seen as having seized the momentum away from Boulos “and running away with it themselves,” a Western diplomat in the region told Al-Monitor.
As Hifter sees things, getting the maritime deal approved by the House of Representatives was a sine qua non for Turkish support and he is believed to have promised Ankara that he would settle the matter more than two years ago. “This is really the significance of the ratification: Saddam proving to the Turks that he can deliver on their interests and be a reliable partner,” Claudia Gazzini, the International Crisis Group’s senior advisor for Libya, told Al-Monitor.
But Ankara knows that in Libya nothing is so easy. Kalin, the spy boss, helped to secure a ceasefire in May last year between the National Unity Government’s forces and rival armed groups after clashes in Tripoli. However, Turkey was unable to prevent them from occurring to begin with.
Moreover, Turkey would not be in a position to deliver full consensus on a unity agreement on the Western Libyan side “without producing some kind of instability and violence, which is explicitly the thing they don’t want to have,” Emadeddin Badi, a Middle East analyst at Chatham House, noted. Besides, there are differences in eastern Libya as well over “elevating Saddam as much as this,” Badi added.
As such, “It would be really surprising to me if all of a sudden Turkey were to say ‘Oh great. You gave us the ratification, now we are going to really support you Saddam and persuade Tripoli to accept you as the next president,’” Gazzini said.
In truth, the ratification changes little from Turkey’s perspective because “they considered the [2019] memorandum of understanding [on the delimitation] with Tripoli already legally valid and Turkey began operating in the relevant waters, as if the treaty were fully effective,” Gazzini added.
Courting Cairo, dumping the UAE
The bigger prize for Turkey would be Egyptian approval of the maritime deal — one that Hifter cannot deliver. Hifter’s relations with Egypt nosedived after he engineered the ouster of Cairo’s close ally, Aguila Saleh, as the Libyan parliament’s speaker in an Oct. 6 vote. Saleh was a vocal critic of the maritime agreement, calling it “illegal and invalid.”
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty echoed that view in a meeting with his Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan in Istanbul on Friday. Egypt has, since the signing of the memorandum between Ankara and Tripoli in 2019, rejected its terms, calling them a violation of the principles of international law and of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Deepening strategic ties between Egypt, Greece and Cyprus in the wake of the agreement was one of the reasons Turkey mended fences with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as it found itself increasingly isolated over its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, among other factors. The two countries have since drawn closer through a series of military deals and security agreements. These include a defense memorandum that was signed in February during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s meeting with the Egyptian strongman in Cairo. The two countries are part of the Regional Four security framework alongside Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Despite its public bashing of the deal, Egypt likely feels reassured that Turkey will not trespass on its territorial waters. “But the problem is it will be very hard for the Egyptians to swallow this pill of having Saddam accede to the presidency,” Badi, the Chatham House analyst, said. This is because Hifter is allegedly a key actor in helping Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces against the Egyptian-backed Sudanese Armed Forces. A UN report released in April revealed that a Libyan battalion affiliated with Hifter’s army had helped to transfer weapons, fuel and fighters to the RSF, which is accused of genocide and war crimes. Khalifa Hifter has denied the claims.
As such, his son’s biggest potential lever “is the Sudan card,” Badi said. He could shut down logistical supply lines to the RSF. “But he’s too enmeshed with Emirati interests to break away,” Badi added. The UAE has very close ties with the Hifters, providing military and financial backing to the LNA during its war against Tripoli’s Turkish-supported army. Saddam burned his bridges to Egypt but would be far harder pressed to ditch the UAE, Badi noted.
'Oil for unity'
Libya has Africa’s largest proven oil reserves and the continent’s fifth largest natural gas reserves. Boulos’ interest in the Libya file is also believed to be connected to promoting the interests of US energy companies. ConocoPhillips, Chevron and ExxonMobil all have stakes in Libya’s energy sector. Boulos is reportedly seeking to leverage those contracts to broker a deal between the Dbeibahs and the Hifters, with the pledge of further US investment should one be achieved.
Much of Libya’s oil wealth is concentrated in the east and the south, which is mainly under the LNA’s control. However, Tripoli alone has the international legitimacy to seal official contracts. With US commercial interests linked to the unification process, it’s understandable why the Trump administration may not be so happy to see Turkey potentially driving the deal. At the same time, Chevron and ExxonMobil have stakes in projects with Greece and Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean that are contested by Turkey.
Unsurprisingly, the Trump administration has neither endorsed nor rejected the Libyan Parliament’s decision. In a statement to Greece’s daily newspaper, Kathimerini, on the issue, a US State Department spokesperson encouraged America’s NATO allies Greece and Turkey to solve their differences through dialogue.
The State Department, however, did put out a statement on Oct. 23 saying the United States was “disturbed” by developments at Libya’s Central Bank. “Efforts to interfere with” the Bank’s “technocratic integrity and independence carry a significant risk of undermining Libya’s financial and economic stability,” it said. The bank controls Libya’s oil revenues, and the parliament’s moves to oust its current governor are opposed by Tripoli. A draft report by a UN Security Council panel of experts that leaked in 2018 determined that Hifter was involved in oil and fuel smuggling networks that saw millions of dollars in oil revenue diverted from the Central Bank.
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