PJAK leader mocks Iran’s claim Turkey spiked US Kurdish-backed regime-change plan

One of Iran's most powerful armed Kurdish opposition groups has pushed back against Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi's claim, made in an interview aired on Sunday, that Turkey blocked Kurdish involvement in US-Israeli plans to overthrow the Iranian regime. Siamand Moeini, a member of the Executive Council of the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), told Al-Monitor in an exclusive interview on Tuesday that it was inconceivable that either the United States or Israel would abandon “a strategic objective of that magnitude out of concern for Turkey’s objections.” Indeed, PJAK believes that, despite their recent squabbles, regime change remains a common goal for Israel and the United States.

Moeini also dismissed claims that his party was secretly collaborating with Turkey and Iran to thwart any efforts by fellow Kurdish groups to weaken the Iranian regime. He noted that four PJAK fighters had perished in a June ambush by regime forces in Mahabad inside Iran. Two members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are believed to have died in ensuing clashes. Moreover, PJAK sympathizers are routinely arrested along with other Kurds who dare press for ethnic rights. At least 36 Kurdish prisoners are thought to have been executed by the Iranian regime since January, according to figures provided by the Hengaw Organization for Human Rights.

At the same time, Moeini warned against alleged Turkish attempts to turn Iran’s ethnic Azeri population against the Kurds, saying this would have “catastrophic consequences” for the region.

PJAK was founded in 2004 by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) along with its Syrian franchise, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), following the US occupation of Iraq in 2003. This was part of a proactive strategy of building up an organized presence in both countries in anticipation of Western intervention against regimes there. The PKK has been waging an armed insurgency against the Turkish state since 1984 but declared a new ceasefire in March last year in line with ongoing peace talks between Ankara and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.

Claims that PJAK had struck a tactical arrangement with the Iranian regime are rooted in a 2011 ceasefire deal that followed a wave of Iranian airstrikes against the group’s camps in the Qandil mountains, which separate Iraq from Iran and where the PKK is also based.

PJAK fighters have skirmished on and off with Iranian forces since then but without any major escalation. Other Iranian Kurdish opposition groups point out that Iran has not carried out any offensive operations against PJAK bases in Iraq since the start of the Iran war in late February, whereas their own forces have been systematically targeted by Iranian drones and missiles even before the war began. Dozens of their fighters and family members have been killed in those strikes.

Despite such misgivings, PJAK’s participation in a coalition of five major Iranian Kurdish opposition parties that was formed in February was hailed as a major step toward Kurdish unity. The Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan declared that it would work to overthrow the Iranian regime and establish self-determination for Iran’s Kurds.

Yet most analysts agree that PJAK’s overarching strategy is one of strategic ambiguity, whereby it keeps its options open through sustained tactical engagement with all the stakeholders.

The interview was conducted via WhatsApp, and the following highlights have been lightly edited for flow and clarity.

On Araghchi’s assertion that Turkey had played an “effective” role in preventing US support for regime change in Iran:

I find that claim difficult to accept. I simply do not believe that the United States or Israel would abandon a strategic objective of that magnitude out of concern for Turkey’s objections. The United States and Israel may disagree over certain tactical questions, but theirs is, in the longer term, a strategic partnership. Iran is not capable of prevailing against a strategic alignment of that kind. Iran is a dictatorial and despotic state. Its system has been sustained through violence, executions and torture.

On Iran’s hostility toward Israel and the United States:

The Islamic Republic embarked on the suppression of Iran’s democratic forces from the very moment it came to power in 1979.

Tehran adopted a strategy of exporting its revolutionary Islamist project. As part of that policy, it invested in the creation and sponsorship of armed proxy organizations in Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon — a strategy that, in our view, has become one of the principal sources of instability across the Middle East. At the same time, hostility toward Israel and the declared objective of eliminating the Israeli state became a central pillar of the regime's regional agenda. Iranian leaders repeatedly asserted, in public and without ambiguity, that Israel should cease to exist.

I struggle to understand the logic behind such a position. On what legal, moral or political basis can the destruction of another state be justified? Jewish communities have lived throughout the Middle East for millennia. The same pattern was evident on 4 November 1979, when the Islamic Republic seized the US Embassy in Tehran. That act of hostility toward the United States set Iran's rulers on the course that has brought them to where they are today.

On whether Israel, the CIA and other agencies sought to enlist PJAK’s active participation in their regime change plans:

I am not aware of any contacts with those agencies or with the institutions of any other state. Our position is nonetheless straightforward: We would welcome support from any government, organization or political actor genuinely prepared to contribute to the transformation of Iran’s totalitarian system into a democratic one. We have made our position unequivocally clear. We do not side with war. However, we welcome any force whose actions contribute to the weakening of Iran if they help pave the way for the establishment of a democratic system in the country.

On claims of collaboration with the Iranian regime:

PJAK has established an organizational presence throughout Rojhelat [Iranian Kurdistan]. Despite sustained efforts to weaken the movement and discredit it, it continues to enjoy the confidence and support of large sections of the population. In other parts of Iran too, PJAK is widely regarded as a pioneering political movement that supports equality for women and their participation in all spheres of life as well as ethnic rights for all of Iran’s ethnic minorities.

Our forces have remained continuously active inside Iran. Most recently, one of our smaller units was caught in an ambush laid by Iranian military forces. The ensuing battle lasted for 10 hours, during which four of our comrades gave their lives. Against this background, I find it difficult to comprehend the claim that we cooperate with either Turkey or Iran. How can we simultaneously be confronting the Iranian regime on the battlefield while collaborating with it?

On claims that the PKK is using PJAK and its potential to mobilize Iran’s Kurds as a card in its negotiations with Ankara:

The dialogue process being led by Mr. Ocalan is, in my view, a measured and farsighted political initiative. As far as I know, no such thing [as the PKK using PJAK for leverage in its talks with Turkey] has happened. Turkey should seize this rare opportunity and pursue the dialogue process with sincerity, political maturity and an open mind. No country has more to gain from this process than Turkey itself.

The problem is that many people do not distinguish between the PKK and PJAK and therefore assume that PJAK’s forces are simply part of the PKK. It is true that the PKK and PJAK are allies. Both operate with the umbrella framework of the Kurdistan Communities Union [that follows Ocalan’s ideology]. But each pursues its own distinct political objectives and organizational structure while cooperating on issues of shared concern.

At present, Iran remains our principal adversary. The PKK’s political struggle is confined to Turkey, where it pursues its campaign for democracy and freedom.

However, the conflict between the PKK and Turkey remains unresolved, and any lasting settlement is inseparable from Turkey’s democratic development. That, in turn, requires Turkey to recognize the rights of the Kurdish nation within Turkey. Unfortunately, Turkey opposes any form of Kurdish self-rule or political status in the region. It continues to view the Kurdish question through a chauvinistic and ultranationalist lens. Assimilation has remained a central pillar of state policy. Under this way of thinking, Turks are seen as entitled to full rights, while other peoples, including Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, Circassians, Azerbaijanis and others, are denied equal recognition.

On claims that Turkey is actively cooperating with Iran against Kurdish groups:

There is ample evidence that Turkey has acted against the Kurdish opposition in Iran and provided Iran with military and intelligence support in operations targeting us. For many years, Turkey enabled Iran to attack us with drones and military aircraft, and dozens of our comrades were killed in those attacks. Because Iran’s air force lacked the capability to strike on its own, it turned to Turkey for assistance, and Turkey fully supported Iran in that effort. Many of our comrades were killed or wounded in those attacks. On one occasion, I was also marked as a target. But thanks to the precautions we had taken, the attack failed. Those attacks have ceased since the dialogue process resumed in Turkey, and Turkish drones and military aircraft have not carried out any operations against us.

On alleged Turkish backing for Iran’s ethnic Azeris:

For years, Turkey has sought to intervene in the Kurdish question—not only within its own borders but against Iraq, Syria and Iran. At the same time, it has sought to establish intelligence networks inside Iran. Nor has it stopped there. In Iranian Azerbaijan, it has sought to recast the [ethnic Azeris] as Turks, advancing what we regard as a gradual process of assimilation across the region. Turkey also seeks to turn Azerbaijanis in Iran against the Kurdish population. Should that strategy succeed, it would have catastrophic consequences for the region, displacing millions from their homes. Unless those policies are halted, the region will face a tragedy on an immense scale.

We seek friendship with the Turkish people. We do not want our two peoples to be driven into conflict with one another. On the contrary, we believe that as neighboring peoples, we can live side by side and build a secure and prosperous future together.