After the twin bombing attacks by the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) in Istanbul that killed 36 police and eight civilians, the Turkish state is stark raving mad and out for revenge. Can this mood impede rational decisions by the state?

Around 10:30 p.m. Dec. 10, two suicide-bombing attacks — one vehicle-borne, the other by a pedestrian — after a soccer game near the Vodafone Arena stadium in Istanbul shocked the country. The terror attack killed 36 police and eight civilians and wounded more than 160 people. The attacks were claimed by the TAK, which I had earlier described as being "designed as a pre-emptive strike force” as the proxy of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

My December 2015 article “Are clashes spreading to western Turkey?” said the PKK, reeling under intense pressure in Turkey’s southeast and in northern Syria, had opted to use the TAK as a proxy to carry out attacks in metropolitan centers and thus ease the pressure it is under, expand the battlefront and send a "We are still powerful" message to its base.

Why is the PKK itself not carrying out attacks against critical targets in western Turkey? The PKK is not willing to squander the positive international reputation it is gaining for its struggle against the Islamic State. It doesn’t want to be judged by international opinion as being a terrorist group (even though Turkey and the United States already consider it to be so). That is why the attacks are carried out by proxies with no active links to the PKK. The PKK actually refuses to acknowledge the TAK's existence. This is a new phenomenon Ankara is not accustomed to.