Certain important lessons have emerged a decade after the 2003 Iraq War. First and foremost, democracy cannot be imposed from above, delivered through a shot in the arm or overnight decree. It is a process that must be accompanied by other variables and initiated not on behalf of Iraqis, but by Iraqis. This could allow for consideration of the societal and historical contexts that weigh heavily on its development.

Second, the breakdown of pivotal state institutions, such as the army and administration, created a power vacuum. This is a typical trait of societies that fail in the important task of building national and political institutions when regimes co-opt political life and limit societal participation. This is also the case when secular ideologies retreat to the advantage of subnational ones — whether sectarian, ethnic or tribal identities — due to national construction only at the official level. Such a vacuum will be filled by people aligned around groups representing primary solidarities. Such configurations of power can obstruct the normal development of democratic life.

Third, the new emerging configuration of power in Iraq was confirmed and consolidated by adopting, de facto, the Lebanese model of governance known as consociational democracy. This model organizes political life along sectarian lines, with one sect dominant over the others until crisis emerges. It is an unstable system that harbors tensions by inviting and encouraging external interference.

Fourth, a policy of imposing a model of change from outside is bound to fail where a regime has created historical and sociological realities resulting in fractured political legitimacy. In such instances, external actors, even those commanding great military supremacy, will find themselves unable to translate their power into influence without understanding and respecting the inherent realities of a country. The Americans learned this at a great price in Iraq.