Turkish friction with Russia and Iran: Tiff or rift, and does it even matter?

Turkish reset? Turkey, Russia and Iran have stayed somewhat unified in recent years, bound by the diplomacy of Russian President Vladimir Putin, shared opposition (if for different reasons) to US policy in Syria, and Ankara’s and Tehran’s mutual antagonism toward Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (again for different reasons). The magnetic pull of those common interests seems to be waning, though, and one reason may be that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recognizes that his only protector in Washington, outgoing President Donald Trump, is leaving next month. A sign of more challenging days ahead is the Trump administration, on its way out, implementing congressional sanctions for Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system, as Jared Szuba reports. 

Here are six signs of some possible changes in Turkish policy with regard to Iran, Russia and the United States, and what it might mean for a Biden administration:

• A poem in Azerbaijan: Erdogan visited Azerbaijan last week on a triumphant tour. The Azerbaijani military could not have reclaimed territory lost to Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh without Turkish military support. The war was popular in Turkey and a marker for Erdogan’s assertive posture in the region. In Baku on Dec. 10, Erdogan indulged himself with a poem, briefly opening a new source of friction with Tehran with stanzas speaking to the separation “by force” of Iranian Azeris from Azerbaijan. That precipitated a diplomatic flurry among the countries’ foreign ministers to clear up the “misunderstanding,” ending with Iran President Hassan Rouhani considering the “matter closed.”