In 1996, a few days after the elections in which he beat Prime Minister Shimon Peres against all odds, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu summoned a senior Likud party member who was a close associate at the time. The man, who still holds a key public office these days, was convinced that Netanyahu wanted to consult with him about the tasks ahead, including the formation of a new government coalition and ministerial appointments. He was wrong. From now on, Netanyahu told the Likud stalwart, Army Chief Lt. Gen. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak is to be considered a political leftist. Netanyahu said he wanted Lipkin-Shahak dubbed a leftist whenever possible.

Lipkin-Shahak, the highly decorated commander of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), was a popular military leader. The handsome, charismatic general, with the prestigious red paratrooper cap tucked under his epaulets, also came across well on television. The IDF was a highly respected state institution and its chief was guaranteed public adulation. With his keen senses, Netanyahu identified the political threat he posed well before it emerged. Three years later, Lipkin-Shahak, by then a civilian, established the Hamerkaz party (Center party) party along with Likud leavers Yitzhak Mordechai, Dan Meridor and Ronnie Milo. The party’s founding weakened the Likud and helped Labor party leader Ehud Barak, yet another former IDF chief, beat Netanyahu in the 1999 elections.

More than 20 years on, nothing has changed. Netanyahu continues to target serving generals and occasional other threats and label them “leftists.” This time, he has incumbent IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, in his crosshairs. Kochavi, too, sports a red paratrooper beret and projects considerable charisma. His other sin is being a protege of Defense Minister Benny Gantz, also a retired IDF chief and currently a bitter political foe of the prime minister. These two former paratroopers, now ensconced in their respective offices at Defense Ministry headquarters in Tel Aviv, are looking on as Netanyahu runs the affairs of state almost single-handedly and keeps them out of the loop.

On Nov. 22, Netanyahu flew off to Saudi Arabia without informing them, without appointing a temporary replacement during his absence and without holding the type of consultations and discussions that precede such a historic move. His September 2019 decision to annex the Jordan Valley and West Bank settlements, which did not work out in the end, was made without holding a professional discussion on the potential implications of such a far-reaching move with the heads of Israel’s security agencies. This prompted a particularly furious conference call by leaders of the security agencies to Netanyahu, just minutes before he was about to announce a historic annexation.