The surprise decision by Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to participate in the 24th Arabian Gulf Cup football tournament, which began in Doha on Nov. 26, has raised the first real hopes of an end to the 30-month Gulf stalemate. In June 2017, the three countries, along with Egypt, launched a total economic and political blockade of Qatar for its ostensible support for terrorism and interference in their domestic affairs. 

The embargo, accompanied by a vicious international media campaign, aimed to isolate Qatar diplomatically and also foment domestic political unrest by undercutting its ability to finance what is likely the world’s most extensive welfare state. These efforts backfired, instead pushing Qatar toward new security and trading partners and prompting ordinary Qataris to rally around their leadership.

Indeed, now more than two years on, signs of economic and political fracture are beginning to show not in Qatar, but in its embargoing neighbors. It is these indications that may help explain the countries’ recent conciliatory gestures, including the resolution to join the Arabian Gulf Cup in Doha and contemporaneous remarks by Saudi and Emirati officials suggesting a newfound openness to ending the dispute.

Until now, analysis of the potential Gulf thaw has focused on regional geopolitics, especially the Gulf monarchies’ common fear of Iran amid its increased belligerency, resumed nuclear activities and a perceived US unwillingness to intervene. Observers have been quick to remind that such a shared threat perception of the Islamic Republic was the original impetus for the 1981 creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which has been rendered all but defunct since the June 2017 crisis.