What would have happened if the missiles fired from Lebanon on Sept. 1 had hit the military ambulance after all, and the news shows had started their broadcasts the next morning with five military funerals? The closer we get to the fateful Sept. 17 vote on the prime minister’s future, the chances of Israel showing restraint and containing the murder of Jews by Arabs grow smaller. Experience shows that the most likely outcome of situations like this is escalation of tension, culminating with Israel getting dragged into rash actions that have nothing to do with strategic considerations.

A similar series of events — the abduction of two Israeli soldiers and the killing of three more by Hezbollah — resulted in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, in which 163 Israelis including 44 civilians lost their lives and 2,628 Israelis (including about 2,000 civilians) were injured. Similarly, the abduction and murder of three Israeli youths in the southern West Bank resulted in 2014 in a military operation in which 50 members of Hamas released in the 2011 Gilad Shalit deal were returned to Israeli prisons. From there, the situation escalated, and Israel launched Operation Protective Edge, in which 68 Israeli troops and seven civilians were killed, and another 2,200 were wounded. The residents of Israeli localities surrounding the Gaza Strip were exposed to rocket fire even after the operation ended. Relative calm across the border was only maintained because of the suitcases of cash that Israel allowed Qatar to transfer to Hamas. It can only be hoped that a stray rocket doesn’t land by mistake on a school full of children, ending the shaky quiet.

Instead of trying to resolve these conflicts on the various fronts, Israel prefers to manage them. But even the most successful and experienced manager is not immune to mistakes, operational failures or just plain bad luck. Even Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah admitted long ago that if he had known that the 2006 soldier abduction would drag Lebanon into a war with so many casualties and so much damage, he would have avoided it. In Israel, too, the Second Lebanon War is considered to have been a rash move in response to an affront and a desire to appease the public.

In order to manage these conflicts, Israel relies on its capacity for military deterrence. The military and technological power at its disposal is orders of magnitude greater than that of any of its neighbors individually or even all together. Nevertheless, recent events in the north show how much of that deterrence is mutual. Lebanon is deterred because it recognizes Israel’s military advantage. In contrast, Israel is deterred by awareness of how exposed its strategic sites and civilian settlements really are.