Russian President Vladimir Putin recently put Russia in the spotlight in Libya by first holding a meeting with Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte on the sidelines of the Belt and Road Summit in Beijing and later discussing Libya with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the phone. Conte reportedly proposed his Russian counterpart to work together on the resolution of the deepening crisis in Libya.

Russian strategy toward Libya may indeed seem puzzling to observers, with constant zigzagging between conflicting parties, which in the words of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is Russia’s approach “to not bet on any one party.” In reality, however, the Russian strategy at present is mostly reactionary and only aims to keep Russia relevant in the Libyan context. Unlike other foreign powers that have established clientelistic partnerships with local actors, the Kremlin has little skin in the game and has little to offer what other foreign powers can’t.

Confusing messages coming from Russian officials reflect approaches and interests to Libya across Russian government institutions that are out of sync as well as a lack of centralized Libya policy planning. Key Russian stakeholders working on the Libya file — the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defense and the largely marginalized Contact Group for Intra-Libyan Reconciliation — all follow their own cautious trajectories on Libya, based on limited signals they receive from the Kremlin. The bottom line is that up until now no Libya policy has been put on paper, but despite that there is a very clear understanding of do’s and don’ts on Libya among these file holders.

As the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) offensive on Tripoli was unfolding in early April Russian diplomats were in contact with both sides to the conflict: Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov spoke to Gen. Khalifa Hifter and to Ahmed Maiteeq, a member of the Presidential Council in Tripoli, expressing Russia’s commitment to the political process led by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. Lavrov’s warning against the use of combat aircraft against the LNA was notable in that it perfectly captures the trauma that Russia suffered in 2011 by letting the West decide how the Libyan conflict plays out and that this geopolitical trauma still haunts Russian policymakers. The use of military aircraft against what Russia sees as the legitimate Libyan army is a deja vu of the NATO bombing on Libya in 2011, which is further reinforced by the belief that US Africa Command and the CIA that have active presence in Janzour and Misrata could be pulling strings.