This week, Israel, Lebanon and Kuwait will be hosting US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on what will be yet another drive by the Donald Trump administration to push back against Iran’s “maligned” regional interests. This visit comes on the heels of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s visit to Iraq last week, one of whose goals is to do what the United States opposes: expand relations with regional countries, namely Iraq.

For Israel, one of the main questions from Rouhani’s visit to Iraq in general, and his unprecedented audience in Najaf with top Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in particular, will be whether it will strengthen the hands of Iranian moderates in Iranian domestic politics.

The likely answer in this case is: hardly. While there are, as noted in an Al-Monitor article titled “Rouhani leverages Sistani visit to maneuver on Iran's regional policy,” approximately 49,000 students based at 300 seminaries in Iran who received stipends from Sistani in 2013, today such numbers do not provide much leverage in Iranian domestic politics. Religious organizations in Iran since former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005 have started to lose their political influence. Before then, presidents used to visit important marjas in Qom to gain support for important political decisions. What about now? Well, how many times has Rouhani visited Qom since coming to office? Seemingly only one.

Rather than visiting Qom, in Iranian politics today and for Rouhani factors that comparatively provide far more leverage are: first and foremost support from the supreme leader, followed by support from regime military organizations, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The third most important factor in terms of providing leverage is support from regime political organizations, especially the Guardian Council, followed by support from various regime economic organizations such as bonyads (foundations). Did Rouhani’s recent visit increase support for him from such organizations? Hardly.