Revolutions are often defined as mass-based movements that violently, over a relatively short span of time, bring down a regime and often lead to a restructuring of the polity and the transformation of the class structure of a society. As a result, it is commonly assumed that the country's foreign policy will also undergo fundamental changes. Yet, while the dominant understanding of revolution is heavily intertwined with change, there has been a good deal of continuity in regional policy when it comes to post-revolutionary Iran.

To trace this continuity, it is important to understand the ways in which Iran’s regional policies are viewed by elites in the country. Their perceptions can be divided into two broad approaches: The “defensive reactive” approach argues that Iran must react to the instability and insecurity surrounding it by transforming such situations into more secure and stable environments. The “revolutionary proactive” approach argues that Iran’s engagement in the region is justified by the country's inherent attributes.

With respect to the defensive reactive approach, to Iran’s west, Iraq poses highly multifaceted challenges and opportunities. Iran has a complex relationship with Iraq on four levels that are relatively independent of one another: state to state, parties/politicians to parties/politicians, clergy to clergy and military to military. In this equation, the priorities and policy orientations of all the respective actors, including their policy recommendations and strategies, are not necessarily identical or even coordinated. The management of such a relationship is thus a huge task for both countries.

Further west, Syria and Lebanon are viewed in terms of Iran's “strategic depth” in the region due to the Islamic Republic’s threat perceptions. In this context, Tehran's ranking of threat perceptions puts the United States at the top, followed by Israel, broader chaos and instability in the region (including terrorism) and the prevailing world order. Saudi Arabia has recently emerged as a distant fifth threat. Iran’s presence in these countries is aimed at establishing effective deterrence and is justified as in principle being defensive and reactive in nature. In other words, its presence is seen as a necessary response to perceived threats. In this equation, Iran’s establishment of effective soft and hard deterrence requires both soft and hard infrastructure.