Is the four-year-old union between the United States and Kurds against the Islamic State in Syria approaching a messy divorce or a second honeymoon? Ankara is quite concerned with the answer, feeling Washington is stalling to avoid a breakup with the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG).

Ankara is trying to pressure Washington to make up its mind, but doesn't want to ruin its own relationship with the Americans. The most discussed question in Ankara nowadays is whether a dialogue or military pressure would be more effective to persuade the United States to terminate its military cooperation with the YPG.

Turkey is anxious to pursue operations against the Kurds east of the Euphrates River. At the moment, however, Turkey’s best commando, armor and special forces elements are engaged in numerous operations: inside Turkey, in northern Iraq, in the northwest Syrian territory it controls in the Afrin area and at de-escalation outposts around Idlib in western Syria. This gives the impression that the Turkish military is overstretched. Without ending one of those fronts, it's very unlikely that Turkey would take on a corps-level, cross-border ground operation east of the Euphrates — one that would surely last more than six months. If it did, the Turkish army would launch a two-pronged operation from Kobani and Tell Abyad along Syria's northern border, linking up at Ain Issa. To do this, Turkey would need double the number of soldiers on standby at the border.

Considering the current force projection of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) at home and abroad, this would be impossible. Moreover, unless the US military — the sole ruler of the air space east of the Euphrates — would allow access, a military operation would be much too long and costly. The most important lesson Turkey has learned from its Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch operations is this: Don’t undertake an operation in northern Syria without ensuring close air support.