The runup to the Kurdish independence referendum that took place Sept. 25 revealed just how politically intertwined different actors are in the modern Middle East. Russia is no stranger to diplomatic games and typically follows a strategy of inserting itself into the most dynamic contexts, hoping to reap benefits and make itself more visible in the region.

It's hard to identify a clear and coherent Russian policy toward Iraqi Kurdistan. Moscow's partnerships with the central government in Baghdad and the Kurds in Erbil are highly situational. However, Moscow shares strong historic ties with both governments. Russia’s relationship with Baghdad goes back to 1958 when Iraqi Gen. Abdul Karim Kassem overthrew the pro-West monarchy. Kurdistan has a more intricate partnership. The decade that the late Mustafa Barzani spent in exile in the Soviet Union seems to have created a strong link between the Barzani clan and Moscow; Mustafa's son, Massoud Barzani, is president of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil.

However, whatever relations Russia has developed with Baghdad and Erbil over the years, the Kurdish independence issue is not confined to Iraq; it echoes in Syria, Turkey and Iran. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently told the TV channel Rudaw, “The Kurdish issue has implications beyond the borders of present-day Iraq” and may have “political, geopolitical, demographic and economic consequences."

Russia’s attempts to market itself as an influential decision-maker on all things Syrian have yielded results. During the past two years, officials from Baghdad and Erbil have flocked to Moscow, each making generous offers of cooperation to Russia. Arguably, all three parties found this to be a convenient arrangement: Both Iraq and Kurdistan present Moscow as a strong advocate of their political position regarding the opponent, while Russia gains benefits in the form of energy and arms deals and projects an image of a great power in the Middle East.