Is there a Syrian Medvedev? (Part 2)

Maxim Suchkov writes that following the visit of US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to Moscow this week, “the departure of President Bashar al-Assad was and remains a non-starter for Russia. What neither Lavrov nor Putin would probably say to Tillerson, but do expect him to understand, is that Russia has invested so much into Syria now, politically and militarily, that Moscow’s primary concern is less about Assad than about the principle, power and prestige of maintaining its position. Hence, any plan that might move Moscow from this standing would have to involve some face-saving mechanism that the Kremlin could package as a win-win internationally, and as a 'decision made in Russia’s best interest' domestically.”

This column last week anticipated that there would likely be little movement in the Russian position on Syria, noting that “Putin has given top priority to re-establishing Russia as a regional power in the Middle East. His backing of the Syrian government boosted his reputation as a credible partner, and he will be loath to lose face. Putin has absorbed the lessons of 2011, when his government acquiesced in a UN resolution authorizing military intervention in Libya, which led to Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi’s overthrow.”

Suchkov adds, “So far, the US vision has been to get Russia on board by offering Moscow an opportunity to 'play a constructive role in the humanitarian and political catastrophe in the Middle East.' That approach misses a critical point in Russian political psychology: The Kremlin believes it has already stepped up as a constructive player to counter the increasingly destructive forces unleashed by the United States. This belief — no matter how uncomfortably it sits with anyone — is not entirely groundless. Many players in the region perceive Russia in this capacity, even if it’s just for their own political reasons.”