It’s become customary not to expect much from the Syria peace conferences. The warring parties argue around same mutual claims, often stick to maximalist positions and frequently seem more interested in trying to project a sympathetic image to outside observers than in discussing the issues on the agenda. External sponsors, in their turn, are usually facing three challenges: whom to invite; how to make the Syrian government and opposition forces to agree to something — even a tiny step — that can be more or less monitored; and how to package mediation efforts as a diplomatic success.

Assembled after numerous delays and rescheduling, the fourth round of Geneva talks held under UN auspices was no exception in this regard. Even Staffan de Mistura, the UN's special Syria envoy, said Feb. 22 that he wasn’t “expecting a breakthrough.” In a sense, this time there were no talks about a Syria settlement per se, but the talks have proved instrumental in moving toward sewing together patches of the opposition groups. This and de Mistura's proposal to create groups to work on drafting the constitution, holding elections and planning for the transition process in Syria have so far been key outcomes of this round in Geneva. The work along these lines is supposed to produce at least modest results until some solution is reached and the parties are ready to move to a more substantial level of discussions. Until that time, everyone should brace themselves for the meetings to be lingering and attritional.

Against this backdrop, major foreign stakeholders in Syria were making some moves before Geneva. Earlier this month at a meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, the top Syria cease-fire sponsors — Russia, Turkey and Iran — decided to establish a joint group to monitor the truce. Russia has also unilaterally asked Damascus to halt the bombing campaign while the Geneva talks are underway — all to make sure the diplomatic progress Moscow has achieved is not in vain.

Another move Russia made was to ensure the negotiations comply with UN Security Council Resolution 2254. Among other things, that document calls for equal participation of different segments of the Syrian opposition, including the so-called Moscow, Cairo, Astana and Khmeimim groups, as well as the Kurds. Russia has insisted on including the opposition groups loyal to Moscow. The groups might lack power or representation on the ground, yet their very presence tempers the moods of more radical opposition peers on a number of issues. The “Cairo group,” for instance, sees Syrian President Bashar al-Assad staying in power for the transition period and leaving once it’s over. The Moscow group is of the opinion that political reform in Syria should top the agenda, not Assad’s fate. Therefore, Moscow sees the presence of these groups in Geneva as a way to reach a more moderate solution.